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INTRODUCTION
In concluding her now classic analysis of the Brazilian import substitution
model, the Brazilian economist Maria Concei^So Tavares pointed out four
"different strategic possibilities" which in 1964 still represented realistic
alternatives for the coming decade. The first possibility assumed the persis
tence of the external bottleneck and stability of sectoral and regional
market structures. A second alternative assumed the persistence of the external
bottleneck but envisioned changes in sectoral and regional market distribution
which would reduce the already exaggerated duality of the system. The third
alternative foresaw the possible expansion of traditional exports and an
improvement in the external sector which would allow the internal structure to
survive "intact." A fourth possibility envisioned export diversification,
especially of manufactured goods, and thus also the alleviation of the import
constraint and the crisis it compelled. "Needless to say," she concluded,
"the four hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, particularly as regards the
possibility of combining some internal changes with modifications in the
external variables,"^
As the above position was being formulated, a series of events, prevading
all the spheres of economy and society, have shaken Brazil. Indeed, many of
Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Bulletin for Latin
America, Volume 9, No. 1, March 1964, United Nations, New York, 1964.
Pp- 1"59« The quotations are taken from pp. 57-59.
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the alternatives Dr. Tavares foresaw occurred in sequence or with some overlap;
the so-called economic pessimists, actually realists, may not have been far
from their mark. The Brazilian econon^r after several brief cycles of exchange
scarcity and abundance, slid into a period of severe import restraint and
recession in 1964-65. Its transmuted emergence from that recession has ushered
in a new era in which the previously regarded bottlenecks—trade, inflation,
and wage policy, as well as the rule of a civilian government—have all been
apparently shattered.
By 1967 the Brazilian economy, under new military management with substan
tial t^cnico collaboration, left its production crisis behind and has since
sustained a growth trajectory unmatched by any country in the Western hemisphere,
The "Brazilian miracle" is characterized by an increased flow of high-technology
imports, promoted receptivity of transnational investment and technique, and
rapid industrial expansion of basic and luxury goods alike. As a consequence
of the sustained pressure on wages, the upward redistribution of income has
facilitated an increase in both consumption and accumulation by the top strata.
The state's own direct and aggressive management of some basic industries,
such as steel and petroleum, and the successful manipulation of the overall
"business climate" favoring profits and reinvestment, have sustained an
industrialization with its own internal dytiamism.
Current Brazilian controversies no longer concern imports or market size
or technological complexity or the feasibility of sustaining the economic boom.
The rules of the political management have been sufficiently altered that only
constraints of Imagination and expediency appear to impede continued growth,
not populist or civilian acceptability. Rather, recent debates concern the
2 For basic critique of the "Brazilian model," see Furtado [38].
rates and reasons for the deterioration in the size distribution of income,
the role of foreign capital, and the success of controlling the domestic price
3
level and encouraging exports. In response to the slack provided by a surplus
in the foreign sector, on the one hand, and to the taughtness of the domestic
political policies, on the other, the economy now appears to maintain a rhythm
to its inward-looking policies fed by its own balanced-growth serums of
political economy.
The purpose of this article is to return to the original area of contro
versy, the foreign sector, and reexamine its structural and compositional
underpinnings. Our goal here is not to complete the early ECLA study, but
rather to extend it, to update its empirical base, and examine some of its
hypotheses in the light of more current findings.
Without a doubt, the full test of the Brazilian "model" today requires far
more evidence than a mere peek into the foreign sector and its comparison to
domestic growth. Indeed, most of the data regarding income distribution,
consumption patterns, and foreign investment which Maria Concei^So Tavares would
like to have examined in the early 1960's is now increasingly available for the
most recent period. Rather than undertake a comprehensive empirical analysis
of these dimensions of Brazilian economic growth, this study will attempt to
focus on the role and behavior of imports during the most recent years of
recession and dynamism. Our goal is to stress the continuity of the entire
postwar period and perhaps cast some light on broader criticisms of the
Brazilian "model,"
In the first section, we review the role of the foreign sector in the
recent analyses of the Brazilian "miracle," These present such a contrast to
3
r7oi t29] and Langonl [61], Morley [76], Morley and Smith [77] andl/oj and winpenny [105J.
each other that one wonders if the several authors are discussing the aatne
phenomenon!
We proceed in the second section to examine the behavior of Brazil's
balance of payments and changes in the nature of the import constraint.
In the third section, we enter the involved realm of the detailed
behavior of imports, charting overall and specific changes in their flows,
and comparing the import structure to domestic production. Our goal here is
to evaluate the decline of import substitution in Brazil and disinter its
remains.
The analysis presented in the first three sections of this paper concen
trates on the statistical profiles of the entering stream of goods and pays
relatively little attention to the Brazilian economic engine which digests
these inflows. In the fourth section, however, we examine vaguely and mech
anically that link between the Brazilian economy and the international flow
of commodities. By studying the movements of exchange rates and tariffs for
500 commodities during 18 years, we seek evidence of continuity in import
behavior during periods of erratic reduction and cyclical growth. The sheer
history itself of Brazil's reliance on capitalist markets and the so-called
price mechanism requires protracted investigation of the protective structure
and its role in rationing scarce imports among users. While the years since
the Brazilian economic "miracle" are too few to distinguish any fundamental
changes, it will be argued that the removal of the import constraint in the
recent period has left the import structure relatively undisturbed. The
continuity of traditional exports, the consummation of changes in the tariff
and exchange systems which had been gradually reformed during the decade,
and the revival of those industries which had suffered during the mid-1960's
recession, all suggest that the current economy is but a slightly altered
successor to the previous one.
In the fifth and concluding section, we outline some reactions to
the various "models" of Brazilian growth discussed in the opening section. Has
the once—thought motor of import—substituting growth in Brazil the replacing
of manufactured imports with domestic production—been itself replaced by the
old classical model of exchange earnings from primary exports? How can we
reconcile the apparent contradiction that this time *round, Brazil appears more
internally cohesive and more "closed"—trade—wise—to international competition
as it propells itself more completely toward fuller integration with the inter
national econoD^.
1. MODELS OP BRAZILIAN GROWTH AND TRADE
A. The ECIA Model—1964
The study of imports has long served as the point of departure for broader
speculation on the nature of the Brazilian economy. In the eleven years since
its publication, the broad hypotheses outlined in the ECLA monograph still
remain valid guidelines for investigation.^
Import substitution, we are reminded, is intended to designate "an internal
development process that rises out of and takes its direction for external
restrictions..."^ The postwar industrialization had grown out of the reaction
to the restictions in obtaining critical imports. The test of these assertions
lies in measuring the initial and subsequential share of imports in total supply;
it forms the key objective of any empirical investigation. Quantitatively,
a significant import share in certain markets demonstrated that the needs and
uses of these products were familiar, and that these imports could be transferred
to domestic production of known minimal dimension once the subsequent
import difficulties were encountered. Qualitatively, these imports had
served to introduce Brazilian society to the newly acquired patterns of
conspicuous consumption being popularized in North America. In the import
slurge of the early postwar period, Brazilian foreign exchange had been expended
for the new consumer goods, giving a thin layer of Brazilian society a taste of
^It may be argued that to continue the focus on the role and composition of
imports is to err in the direction but not the spirit of previous investigations.
Just as the terraced offices of the U.S. foreign assistance mission (AID) offer
a spectacular and symbolic panorama'.of the Rio harbor, it may be appropriate to be
preoccupied with the critical nature of North American sanctions and financing
for the Brazilian miracle. Yet the remainder of the economy, hidden by the
surrounding mountains, also occupies an appropriate field of study. It is with
both of these emphasis in mind that this paper attempts to carry forward both
the spirit and method of the 1964 landmark.
^£CLA, op. cit., p. 5.
the commodity samples which had become known to the upper and middle classes of
the industrialized countries during the prosperity of the 1920*s. The
Brazilian appetite once whetted, domestic production of these goods proved a
natural carryover.
Underlying this histrocial development, of course, lay the fundamental
duality of the Brazilian economy. In the industrial countries, Maria Concei^So
Tavares had written, production of goods for export and domestic consumption was
carried out using similar technologies and similar capital-labor proportions.
But in Brazil, the high productivity sectors had been reserved almost exclusively
for the export enclaves, while sectors oriented for the domestic market, such as
subsistence agriculture and handicrafts, were characterized by both low labor
productivity and sparce deployment of capital. The decision, then, to maintain
the supply of certain previously-imported goods by means of domestic production
meant transferring to Brazil the modern technology developed in the Industrialized
countries. Thus the process of import substitution may be seen as the process
by which domestic industry comes to satisfy a new set of needs using a tech
nology previously reserved for the export enclaves.
The adoption of capital intensive processes extends the arena of internal
duality to all of modem manufacturing. The contrast between high and low
productivity is illustrated by the displacement of older mechanical techniques
of food processing and of cotton textile production by more fully automated food
packaging and synthetic textiles. The agricultural duality continues with a
vengenace, as mechanized soybean cultivation for export competes for the same
land as com. Thus what had begun initially as an attempt to sustain newly-
introduced consumption patterns by means of internal production has become,
despite whatever favorable dynamic linkages, the agent by which capital-intensive
techniques invade or "modernize" (to use common parlance) the older industries
which had intensively used labor or had mechanized in earlier periods.
8Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the intent of the import substitution
process was never to save absolutely on foreign exchange earnings or to become
s^lf~sufficient. Rather, the intent was to redistribute the scarce foreign
exchange to guarantee the inflow of capital and intermediate goods which could
permit the extension of a living standard to at least a portion of Brazilian
society. Given this propulsion, the growing demand for intermediate and capital
goods required by the growing final consumer goods industries far exceeded the
old levels of the imported final consumer goods themselves. And with the rise
of the manufacturing enclaves came as well the widening of the production
duality, deepening the already extreme polarities in income and the division
of labor.
The growth process, however, began to generate its own difficulties. The
extremities in income and the shallowness of real purchasing power impeded the
exCenstion of a real mass market, and difficulties in obtaining technology and
certain raw materials as well as the increasing burden of profit remittances
all appeared to act as a brake on the growth. The initial growth spurt, so
ebullient in the late 1950's, appeared to be grinding to a halt by the early
1960*s.
Several avenues of escape remained as the economy reached this "advanced
stage of substituting industrialization, and certain policy steps could reform
or postpone the crisis which was foreseen. The first alternative (mentioned
above) foresaw heavy public investment in basic infrastructure and services to
compensate for the lagging "capitalist sector" and the worsening income distribu
tion generated by the extreme dualities. Asecond alternative, requiring a
completely different political orientation, would focus heavy public investment
on the low productivity regions and sectors to gradually reduce the economic
duality. A third scenario envisioned the revival of external demand for tradi
tional exports to finance the resumption of large scale Imports, permit further
industrial expansion, and undercut the need for structural change. Fourth, the
expansion of industrial exports could provide the dynamic industries already
established in Brazil with a second wind, accentuate the present duality, and
also postpone the crisis.
In actuality, the developments since 1965 have approximated most closely
the possible trajectories of the first, third, and fourth alternatives, following
a change in political orientation making the third increasingly unlikely. That the
scenarios of the 1960*8 should follow those alternatives so closely reflects
the knowledge and intuition of the ECIA economists as they gauged both the
adaptability of the Brazilian economy and the full range of political solutions
available to it in the middle 1960*s.
B. The Early Period, a Recapitulation
A certain historical perspective may be instructive in understanding the
Import substitution process which attained prominence as such in the late 1950*s.
The conventional wisdom, popular despite its almost antihistorleal origins,
places the birth of import substituting industrialization in the postwar period
and almost totally ignores all the earlier phases of a very long process. The
recent rediscovery, at least in the English-language literature, that Brazilian
industrialization has in fact a history comes as no surprise.^
The process of import substitution In the 1950*s can be seen as none other
than the closing phases of a century-long struggle to oust the foreign trader
and close the sieve-like openness of the economy to imports. Both Furtado [39]
and Graham [43] emphasize the colony-like preservation of the Brazilian market,
as British goods flooded the Brazilian market and British merchant houses were
See Bergsman [ 7] for a brief recent history of a number of industries,
and Leff [66] and Fishlow [30] for the recent rediscoveries.
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set up in Brazil to handle them."^ The treaties of the 18th and early 19th
century had provided Britain with exclusive rights to the Brazilian market,
but even with the expiration of the early trade agreements, Brazilian attempts
to provide protective tariffs for infant industry were consistently defeated
through the end of the 19th century. The British traders and their free trade
ideology were assisted by the Sao Paulo coffee interests who defeated tariffs
or their imported machinery and industrial products exchange for their coffee
Q
exports.
The maintenance of the Brazilian market for imports was not accomplished
without severe conflict, at least within commercial circles, but the outcome
of the beginning industrialists on the one hand, and the coffee growers, banks,
shipping companies, insurers and the urban commercial classes on the other,
all contributed to the delay of the national industrial effort. "Although
urban classes, depending on both one and the other activity [coffee and industry],
found the British eminently helpful in making Brazilian cities over in the image
of the modern world," writes Graham, "the complex of British interests in the
export—import economy tended to slow down the process of modern change,"^ Free
trade thus provided the ideological "cover" for the dominant planter class just
as import substitution served the national industrialists a century later.
Two important factors grew out of the ultimate decline of British influence
which followed the financial crash of 1914, First, a new set of imports began
arriving predominantly from Germany and North America, and these included such
. 7 Graham [43], p. 82.
g
Naturally, Graham cites the British responsibility: "..,as in all those
actions which continued to place primary emphasis on exports and imports after
the conditions for industrialization had been created, the British were a drag
upon the forces of modernization." [43], p. 110.
^Graham [43], p. 11,
11
20th century industrial trappings as American coal for steam ships, electrical
and rail equipment for urban lighting and transport, and continent-linking cables.
German and American interests challenged British dominance in shipping and
banking, and Brazilian interest awakened in expanding diplomatic ties with the
United States.
A second factor which promoted domestic industry was the isolation imposed
by the shortage of shipping in World War I and the difficulties of world trade
during the depression. Wartime interruption may be viewed by the historian as
"the artificial impetus" which "greatly accelerated the process,but whatever
the initial cause of isolation—shipping shortage or foreign exchange shortage—
the period served as a test of national industry, requiring the Brazilian capital
ist to provide for their own needs and giving them a taste of the profits from
expanded and protected production.
The relative isolation of Brazil during World War II leads to very similar
effects. First, Brazilian industry was again allowed to try its hand, free from
the intrusion of international capital. Second, the short lived opening of
trade at the end of the 1940*s, accomplished with the accumulated exchange
reserves, served as well to update Brazilian consumer tastes with the new
appliance-automobile culture of the industrialized countries but not yet fully
appreciated in the so-called developing world.
Seen in this century-long perspective, the decline in the importance of
trade suggests the transformation of a once open economy to one in which direct
^^Graham [A3], p. 299, the implied dichotomy between a natural or artificial
impetus escapes this reader.
^^The observation of an "inward looking orientation in tariff, monetary, and
exchange-rate policy long before 1929," by Leff, [66], p. 491, is an understate
ment compared to history's chronicles of the role of foreign enterprise and the
factors which made for their permanence and gradual displacement.
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imports, especially consumer goods and capital equipment, play an increasingly
smaller role.^^ The study of imports in the modem era may perhaps reflect the
emphasis of a tail supposedly wagging a grown elephant. Brazilian writers
have long been more cognizant of the correspondence between economic growth
and the carving of the commercial markets in the giant hinterland, the widening
of the coastal markets once supplied with imported English goods and financed
by an impressive sequence of primary exports.
The discussion on the early trade period, when Brazilian industry began to
assert its independence from its role as an export appendage for industrialized
Europe and North America, focuses unfortunately on considerations of efficiency,
comparative advantage, and optimality,^^ But once the market has been effectively
"domesticated" by national industry, only careful scholarship, not speculative
hypothesizing, will reveal that primevel tale which once was so important in the
traditional economy. The more relevant concern should be with the structure of
the newly evolved animal: how it moves through economic space, the difficulties
it encounters, and the dangers it creates for the different parts of its
environment and body politic as it stumbles along.
C. The Intermediate Period, 1950--1964
The period 1950-64 is generally recognized as the era of Industrial growth
and structural change in Brazil, However, the neglect of manufactured exports.
1 9 The emphasis on the increasing autonomy of the national econon^ and on
its own responsibility for its business prosperity is somewhat challenged by
the thesis presented by Leff [64] that the recession of 1964-65 was anticipated
by the failure of exports in the early 1960's. This focus on the foreign sector
as the major propellant of the Brazilian economy seems almost vestigial of the
era in which coffee earnings in the open economy did spell the difference between
boom or bust.
^^See Furtado [39].
^^Fishlow [30], ch. 1.
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the apparent fragility of the economy, its susceptibility to wide
swings of business activity, and its dependence on earnings from
primary exports have all stirred up a series of controversies on the nature of
this import-substituting industrialization. Some terms of debate center on
the efficiency of foreign exchange disposition, the exemption or redundancy of
tariff protection, the optimality of the industrial base, and the creation of
backward and forward linkages. The history of these debates forms the
substance of the vast development literature of the 1960*s with respect to
import substitution, generally calling Brazil as a prime witness for this or that
position.
The point of departure for the debate on import substitution begins invariably with
the model of import dependence developed initially by the Prebisch Academy
in Santiago with its predigious research into matters concerning the terms of
trade and the course of import substitution as a political alternative to
devaluation in the postwar period. Actually, once the internal income distribu
tions are accepted, along with the choice of lifestyle and imitated consumption
patterns, then all degrees of freedom of action are used up as the import
constraint becomes binding: there ^ no choice but to usher in foreign-produc
tion techniques and equipment. The only area of discretion remains
with which that style of living could be achieved and the terms of entry under
which foreign capital (now viewed as the collaborators) are to be negotiated.
Were foreign companies to be allowed to roam freely the entire spectrum of the
Brazilian market or would they be limited as to terrain and tenure?
Against a backdrop of "hsotility and fear of foreign investment,"the
decline in export earnings had so alarmed the Brazilian authorities that an
almost complete reversal on their posture toward foreign investment was
^^Leff [63], 1968, ch. 4.
U '
accomplished rather quickly. On the basis of the Monetary Authority (SUMOC)
Instruction 113, direct foreign investment began flowing again into Brazil,
reaching over $90 million in 1956.^^ Nevertheless, the penetration of foreign
industry seems to have been quite contained in certain sectoral spheres much
like the Europeans to the spatial treaty ports of 19th century China. Certain
industries were promoted rapidly with the use of direct foreign capital, such
as automobiles, steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, cement, some capital equip
ment, and drugs. No major U.S. hotel chain was allowed to buy a place in the
Copacabana sun (that remained a decade off), and the "instant hostility and
panic" described by Leff may have been more a premonition of what was to come
later.
But how could the sudden reversal on foreign capital (made perhaps under
duress) have come so quickly in light of the traditional fear of foreign
investment by the Brazilian industrialists? Borrowing heavily on recent contri
butions to bourgeois political theory, Leff suggests that, despite its historical
role, the local industrial establishment actually had little clout in government.
He favors the explanation that the classic conflict between planter and indus
trialist is resolved in the nature of clientelistic politics which operates
almost indifferently to the real grass roots strength of different interest groups.
Even with the electoral process functioning, the presidency could allegedly act
autonomously of the influence of industrialists "despite their material power.
A group of "apolitical, technical specialists," the tecnico, headed the state
bureaucracy, guided national policy, implemented presidential policies, and allocated
national investment resources. The structure of clientelistic politics.
Leff [63], Table 13. p. 61.
Leff [63], p. 109.
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Table I.l
Brazilian Economic Growth, 1948-71
- Average Average of Annual Shares
Average of
annual growth
annual
growth rate
GDP/capita
personal govern
ment con
sumption
capital
• forma
tion
con
sumption
3
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1948-50 4.4 72.0 12.0 16.5 14.7 23.3
1951-53 3.0 72.1 12.4 17.6 -8.7 -2.8
1954-56 3.6 73.0 12.3 14.0 -8.7 1.4
1957-59 4.0 71.7 12.5 14.8 4.2 9.7
1960-62 5.1 72.3 13.2 14.1 2.3 -5.4
1963-65 -0.5 72.5 12.6 13.2 7.2 4.1
1966-68 ' 3.4 74.3 11.8 14.3 4.9 10.3
1969-71^ 6.8 74.2^ 11.7^ 15.0^ — —
1971^ 7.3 — — — — —
Total Period; 3.85 72.8 12.3 14.9 4.5 5.8
Sources: column (1) from IBGE, Retrospectivas, p. 216, for annual growth rates,
1948-62. For revised series, 1963-71, from IBGE, Anuario
1973, p. 566.
columns (2-4) calculated from Expenditures in constant 1953 prices.
1948-59 from Retrospectivas, p. 216, 1960-69 from Anuario
1973, p. 566.
Notes: (1) Preliminary estimates
(2) 1969 alone
(3) "capacity to import"
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responsive to elite opinion and managed by the apolitical t^cnico, could thus
function independently of large interest groups. As a theory, it stands as the
antithesis to democratic politics and the Brazilian view of the importance and
influence of their own industrialist class.
By 1962 the decline in export earnings had thus placed the economy in an
even tighter import bind. With the combined domestic crisis of the Brazilian
economy, the failure to interest new foreign capital and the reduction of
export earnings, the increasing burden of profits remittances led to the triumph
of the antidisestablishment view of foreign capital "as a drain rather than an
19addition to net-foreign exchange resources." The resuscitated "cover," the
balance of payments constraint, was called up against, the once-courted foreign
investor. Further provoked by foreign takeovers of national companies, the
wrath of populist politics guided by tecnico rationalization "moved against
foreign investment in Brazil" which obligingly withdrew temporarily to the
sidelines.
D. 1964 to the Present; an Overview
The hectic pace of civilian reform, the ideological confusion of the
closing, years, and overall economic difficulties precipitated the military
intervention of April 1964. At first viewed apprehensively as a mere bridge
between civilian regimes, the entrance of the military into Brazilian government
has marked a new era in political economy.
The sincerity of the regime toward economic orthodoxy and price stabilization
was quickly reestablished and the threats against foreign capital removed. At
once the new Brazilian government became an accredited risk and prime candidate for
^^ECLA [28],
19 Leff [63], p. 72.
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badly-needed loans by both the foreign public and private interests. Generous
developmental assistance arid import support was provided by United States AID and
by the IMF through 1967, Private enterprise, still hesitant to tread where it
once had been spurned, held.back until the 1964-67 recession was unambiguously
ended. In this case, it appears that it was the North American, diplomatic
flag which led in the reentry of Brazil, to be belatedly followed by
private investment. The repeal by the Brazilian military of the 1962 law^^
restricting remittances served notice that Brazil was now open to private foreign
enterprise and heartened the U.S. agencies that generous public ass^istance
might soon give way to private "assistance." Thus committed to finding the
responsible path to growth within the community, Brazil at once had reputiated
the "romantic nationalism" of the previous regime and prepared itself to
receive massive amounts of capital transfers under the familiar themesong of
strengthening the balance of payments.
These developments coincided with a "liquidity squeeze" on the part of
Brazilian companies whose sale was permitted for the first time to foreign
interests if they "could no longer find domestic sources of credit. Thus
the rediscovery by international capital of the Brazilian market has been
facilitated by the merger and absorption of national companies, undermining
industries once free from foreign control. This "denationalization" of
Brazilian industry marks the bursting out of foreign capital from the confines
of its sectoral treaty ports.. Certain Brazilian markets were posted against
trespassing by foreign capital, and, like oil, remained the exclusive preserve
of state industry. In other industries, national capital quickly sought
20The law had not been put into effect until January 1964. See
Skidmore [90].
^^Skidmore [90], p. 21.
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alliances with foreign interests in areas previously reserved for Brazilian
ent rep reneurs.
Internally, the stabilization policy failed to halt the general
upward swing of prices, and the total dismantling of the trade unions by the
military prohibited the concurrent upward adjustment of wages. The disparity
in the wage and price increases led to a decline in the real standard of
living of the working class, and redistributed income to those classes who
could both consume luxury goods and assist in capital accumulation.
In summary, post-1964 Brazilian policy may be characterized by the
symmetric exploitation of its natural resources, both human and material. With
one arm, pressure has been applied to the already-formed working class, aimed
at generating greater profits for accumulation. With the other arm, Brazil
encouraged the exploitation of its material resources, converting land from
foodstuffs into export crops, and by promoting mineral and forest exports.
Organizationally, state enterprises have been revitalized and nominally
promote free enterprise while acting as cartel leader. Protecting and promoting
complementary private investment, state enterprises have often relied as well
on extensive foreign assistance, technology, and capital. In some fields ceded
by the state to private enterprise, foreign enterprise was also admitted, as
in banking and consumer goods. Thus both the Brazilian state and private
enterprises have found themselves the strange bedfellows of foreign capital.
The Fishlow Model
Two polar analyses of the Brazilian "miracle" illustrate the divergence
of outlook and sensitivity of American and Brazilian social science.^^ Fishlow,
7 9 It is ironic that the position in which economic factors figure prominently
is espoused by a political sociologist, while an analysis in which political and
social factors are held pivotal is promoted by a North American economist. See
Fishlow [31] and Cardoso [15],
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in his analysis of the 1964-67 period sees the crushing of the lower class,
the freezing of its standard of living and the redistribution of Income to the
upper classes (all in the name of monetary stabilization) as leading to a
resurgence of industrial growth "...based in part upon lagged cyclical
t 23adjustment to previous import-substitution oriented industrial development."
The early "orthodox model" which had guided the Brazilian regime from 196A to
1966 and pushed by the foreign aid donors was a contradictory hybrid of
excess demand, quantity theory of money, and cost-push inflation. Not only was
there no empirical basis for any of the three, Fishlow writes, but the attempt
to apply jointly remedies for all three conditions simultaneously was inconsis
tent and irrelevant.
In April, 1967, almost accidentally, the money supply was loosened up and
to the surprise of the policy makers, real output increased. The monetary
correction extended to the exchange rate as well as to domestic prices and
wages, the recession now seemed a bad memory, and pent-up growth the only way
to go.
The true priority of the military government, Fishlow writes, was not
stabilization at all but rather to create the smooth functioning of the free
market, in short, "to make market capitalism work."
Fishlow sees the newly claimed role of the state as the referee for the
driving forces of capitalist enterprise: state, private, or foreign. New
laws governing capital markets, to protect minority investors and regulate the
stock exchanges, are obvious necessities for a growing capitalist country.
^^Fishlow [31], p. 70.
0 /
•^^In one sense, the explanation of the Brazilian combination of recession
and inflation, then called stagflation (much like today's phenomenon in
America) takes on the appearance of a centaur, with the head Keynes, mounted on
the body of the horse-quantity theorists, and winged by the excess demand of
the structuralist school. Unlike the price level, this animal never got off
the ground.
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The creation of a well-endowed National Housing Bank (BNH) has stimulated
private savings and chanelled resources into middle class housing projects,
reducing private rents and freeing more funds for middle class purchases of
consumer goods.
A review of Fishlow's critique of alternative explanations of the Brazilian
"miracle" allows us to comprehend and react to his own cyclical position. Fishlow's
attack on Furtado is both a simplification and a misrepresentation of that position.^'^
Fishlow holds that proof of the Furtado-type structural imbalances would rest
on sharp discontinuities between consumption patterns of the poor and rich, while
the actual consumption studies of Brazil find a smoothness to expenditure
patterns across income classes. Furthermore, he remarks, the market for
consumer durables show no evidence of saturation. Wherein lies the stagnation
predicted by these writers?
The argument advanced correctly by Furtado and others anticipated a more
inflexible industrial mix in the longer run. The Brazilian miracle, on the
other hand, demonstrates rapid adjustment to changing market conditions and
the willingness of industry to alter its commodity composition and design In
order to avoid the dilemma which would be posed by the increasing concentration
of income and expected market saturation.
The observation made by Fishlow that expenditure patterns are not bipolar
but continuous is anincorrectly stated tantology which emanates from the
methodology of budget surveys. The very estimation of Engel curves, smooth
lines stretching the whole span of incomes, glosses over the severe differences
between consumption baskets, which surely exist, as anyone knows who has
25 Furtado is characterized as "a variation upon Maltus*s original theme
from his famous correspondence with Ricardo." But Furtado perhaps owes much
more to Marx's perception of the imbalances between Departments I and II
than to any other writer. See Capital II, Chapter XX.
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traveled from Crato to Caxlas do Sul, In expenditure analysis, on the other hand,
all social classes are lined up horizontally by income levels and their
consumer goods arrayed vertically. The number of people in each of these
indiscrete classes disappears except as a weight to the invariably curvilinear
relationship. The wealth of survey detail which goes into consumption pattern
analysis emerges fully distillated, as a family of Engel curves
The second type of model criticized by Fishlow is the notion that Brazil
has entered into a "fascist colonial" phase, subordinate to American
imperialism. He points to the rise of Brazilian exports, especially of manu
factured goods,.as evidence of greater Brazilian independence. Only by studying
the commodity and country concentration of trade would we be in a position to
Judge whether Brazil's export thrust actually has created circumstances of
greater autonomy or involvement with the industrialized countries.^^ Even
if the exports themselves were manufactured goods, it is essential to know
whether they consisted entirely of intra-firm shipments at different stages of
production. Increased reliance on exports of primary goods or on manufactures,
each subject to its own cycle, may in fact reduce the autonomy of the Brazilian
economy and render it more vulnerable to the vagaries of foreign capital. But
all this misses the point, since the dependency arguments are phrased not in
terms of material flows of merchandise goods or services, but in terms of the
internal effects of foreign capital and the influence of the so-called "invisible
Ironically, it is Fishlow in his analysis of income distribution [291
thL^anyon^elfr^*'^ ^*' circumstantial evidence in support of the Furtado thesis
27 As we shall see in a later section, exports of manufactured goods are
^nor, and the economy s dependence on primary exports has been diversified,
dence commodities is any adequate measure of that depen-
22
flows" which are hardly so Invisible to students of technology, consumption,
and accumulation.
Fishlow does concede that the increase in exports has allowed greater
imports and with them, "an entry for the winds of competition too frequently
absent in monopolistic national markets. But as we shall see, the rigid
maintenance of a highly differentiated tariff structure has served to allay
any threat to well-protected goods, despite a loosening up of the overall level
of imports.
The Cardoso Model
Cardoso's model of "associated-dependent development" is a convincing
statement of the economic posture which Fishlow has discarded. Cardoso stresses
the developmental changes of the Brazilian economy, not its supposedly cyclical
swings. Under the excuse of rapid industrialization, the Trojan horse of
American capital had been ushered within the walls of the Brazilian market,
and with the change of regimes in 1964, the state promoted the integration
29of the national comprador class and the foreign capitalist. It is this entry
of international capital directly in domestic manufacturing which, according
to Cardoso, has increased the interdependence at the international level and
has set a limit to the freedom of action of countries on the periphery which,
in an earlier era, had specialized in raw material production. This "new
international division of labor" (a term rejected naturally in the
lexicon of bourgeois economy) sees the rise of the national Brazilian economy
as a peripheral site for continued primary exports and some new phases
of manufacturing. The internal Brazilian market, once dominated by national
^®Fishlow [31], p. 102.
29 Cardoso [15], p. 144-145.
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firms, is now serviced by American companies producing both in Brazil and North
America.
In the older models of import substituting development, industry was to
be controlled by the local bourgeoisie and the state. The state in the old moclcL
was to be the capitalist; Brazil was to have developed a "capitalism without
capitalists." In the new "associated-dependent development" model, it is the
state which prepares the terrain for the alliance of the middle class and
foreign capital, while private capital lies at the heart of its dynamic growth.
It is the state which executes crimes against national enterprise and the
national working class now in the name of national security. In allowing
the military to dismantle the trade unions, the bourgeoisie achieve a
diminution of real wages and sacrifice their claims for their own political
representation on the altar of profits.
The political apparatus completely neutralized, this new international
division of labor has been strengthened by a kind of monetary and psychic
indebtedness which creates a kind of dependence of the military regime on
intemaional agencies, private, public, and noncivilian. What Leff had described
earlier in the framework of clientelistic politics, Cardoso analyzes as the
autonony of the military and its civilian technocracy. With congressional
interference silenced, the most antipopulist faction of the tecnico cadre has
ascended, Cardoso writes, taking "upon themselves not only the
modernizing function in administration, but also the repressive function of
the social and political realm.
The difference between the newly-created bourgeoisie, "a child of depen
dent capitalism," and the middle classes of the industrialized countries of
the previous century lies in its source of direction. New technology comes
Cardoso [15], p. 146.
24
down from America, and labor saving techniques are introduced into Brazil
("technological innovation") at the will of international conditions, not
31
their own applicability to the Brazilian labor situation.
To sum up, "the regime is autocratic: its mode of organization is
military-bureaucratic." Cardoso writes, "it does have a dynamic economic
32
foundation... [but] there are also economic limitations...' In his pessimism,
Cardoso forsees the stability of the military regime and a bleak outlook for
the prospect of democratic reform in Brazil. In this way, Fishlow offers
his own inverted prediction, challenging the permanence of the Brazilian model
and anticipating the cyclical difficulties and regional imbalances.
Some Conclusions
A more generous view of recent Brazilian development would see the
Periphery encountering a set of problems long familiar in the industrialized
Center. Indeed, Brazil holds its place as a minor but congruent capitalist
power. Whether the redistribution of income to the upper class takes place
violently through the repression of trade unions or by high rates of
unemployment and inflation, the stories are stikingly similar, whether told
in South or North America, The problems of irrational and irregular production,
of social and regional inequalities, of excess capacity in the face of physical
depreivation, of efficient techniques engineered for redundant or unneeded goods,
all these problems have been known to political economists for some time.
It may be perhaps more useful to view the Brazilian miracle in the frame
work of international capital, great physical distances not withstanding.
"^ Cardoso overstates the point. Does it really matter if a Ford Galaxy
is assembled by a crew of 100 manual laborers or on a mass assembly line?
To focus too much attention on capital-intensive techniques misses an examina
tion of the very goods which are produced.
^^Cardoso [15], p. 172.
•J
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Indeed, the coming of age of Brazilian capitalism and its rapprochement with
foreign investment coincides with the expansion of the multinational corporation
and the extension of branch plants and offices to the southern hemisphere.
Other economists have pointed out that it would be a mistake to think of
33import substitution and export promotion in separate stages. Hirschman
has written that the national bourgeosie must first reinforce their home market
before they risk outward expansion, while Leff and Robuck minimize the
dichotomy in stages.
The real obstacles to the expansion of domestic manufacturing in inter
national commerce may have nothing at all to do with the competence and
competitiveness of national entrepreneurs, but rather the world-wide division
of markets. Exports of Brazilian electrical turbines by General Electric
do Brasil pick up when GE's Spanish plant is being struck. The General Motors
plant in Campinas exports spare parts to the United States for its 1954 Chevy
pickup because North American manufacture of that model has long been discon
tinued. Volkswagon sales from Brazil to the United States are reserved for
German production, regardless of comparative costs or excess capacity in
Brazil.
Thus the crisis of import substitution first analyzed in the early 1960's
has, for the time being, been resolved by a realignment of Brazil more closely
with the current phase of Western capitalism. The maturing of the national
comprador class, emerging from its infant cacoon of isolated and casual
entrepreneurship, is overseen by state enterprise as the big business leader
in Brazil, Volta Redonda plays the part of the U.S. Steel, and Petrobras stands
in for Standard Oil of New Jersey. Is it not natural that Brazilian state
and private enterprise alike seek the stablizing links in style and substance
Hirschman [45], Leff [63], ch. 5, and Robuck [86],
26
with their older, more established counterparts in North America, Western
Europe, and Japan?
One observation made above but insufficiently developed here deals with
the sampling of the domestic market first by foreign imports, its consolidation
by domestic capital, and then the further exploitation by the alliance of
state, foreign, and national enterprise. But these are later stages of the story
which forms the initial intent of this paper, namely, the examination of
imports and the evolution of their structure.
On the other side of all these developments, and hardly mentioned here,
is the unexamined story of the formation of the working class, the reduction
of rural self-sufficiency, and the patronage and then destruction of the Brazilian
labor movement. But these events remain to be told elsewhere.
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II. BRAZIL'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
A, Bottleneck or Pretense?
The annual balance of payments, its development and stability, is said
to have operated as the major constraint on economic and political growth.
In this section we examine the composition, utilization, and degree of freedom
afforded by the international sector. We also shall consider changes in import
capacity with the expansion of exports.
The annual series of Brazil's balance of payments from 1947 until 1973
(Table II.1) presents both continuity of and departure from a number of long-run
trends. The early period, especially 1947-51, is characterized by a surplus
in merchandise exports counter-balanced by a deficit in service imports (col.
1 and 2). The highly favorable merchandise balance in 1950 was due to the
bouyant prices of world coffee and the negative balance in 1952 by the large
purchase of capital goods in that year. A negative balance of merchandise
imports of such proportions does not recur until 1971.
The period thus opens with a balance on current accounts (col. 5) of
variable but largely negative character, reaching its lowest point during the
1951-52 period with the massive importation of capital goods. From 1957 through
1962, however, these negative balances in current accounts continue annually,
reaching a peak in 1960 and persisting through 1963. Only in the recovery of
1967 do the large negative balances in service exports begin to climb past
previous levels, reaching magnitudes unrivalled in recent Brazilian history.
The fundamental changes in the structure of the balance of payments can
be seen in the weakness of general merchandise exports relative to the apparently
insatiable appetite for merchandise imports, the persistence of service imports,
and the massive movements of noncompensatory capital flows. Import of
29
noncompensatory capital (col. 6) are at first negligible or negative until
1951, when capital begins to enter erratically and with some hesitation. From
1956 till 1962, inflows of capital achieve a high level (except for 1960)
discouraged by the recession of 1963-65 and frightened by the accompanying
political changes. Only after 1968 does the magnitude of noncompensatory capital
offset the unprecedented deficit in the balance of current accounts. The
overall balance of payments position (col. 8) in the period following 1969
is therefore extremely favorable, thanks to the inflows of foreign capital.
The periodic negative balances encountered from 1947-49, 1951-52, and 1957-63,
never again make their appearance after 1965, except for the lone exception of
1967. The year 1963, the only year since 1950 to record negative capital flows,
marks also the end of hostility to foreign enterprise and the high point of
internal political instability.
Writing in 1964, Marxa Concei^ao Tavares had noted two periods in the
Brazilian balance of payments. The early period owed its growth to the expan
sion of the exports sector, while the second period, beginning in the mid-1950's,
the inflow of autonomous foreign capital began to offset the failure of the
, 34expansion of export performance. But the incipient capital flows noted in the
period 1956-62 which had receded in 1963-67 were merely foreshadowing the huge
capital inflows which began in 1968 and continue to the present day. They
set the stage for future profit and interest payments which may again be
expected to become a major drain when enthusiasm in Brazil by international
capital begins to subside.
In another sense, this recent cycle may be more vicious. Any temporary
failure in export prices or any desire to increase imports must be offset by
even greater imports of capital, adding to the already high levels of these
^^ECLA [28], p. 15.
30
inflows and their future obligations. But these premonitions, once voiced
by earlier regimes in less fortunate circumstances, have been set aside with
the change in official ideology.
A major alteration-in the style of remedying the balance of payments
deficit can be seen as a change from official loans (in 1957-60 and again
1962-63) to fostering an increase in foreign assets which testify to the
unambiguous "opening" of Brazil since 1969 (col. 11).
Aside from the overall imbalances, the structure of the origin of
receipts and expenditures also illustrate some major changes throughout the
later period (Tables II.2 and II.3). Maria ConceipSo Tavares had earlier
remarked on the deterioration of the export sector and the reduction in the
nation's reliance on commodity exports for foreign exchange earnings. For the
years 1948-52, f.o.b. exports had accounted for 92.5% and capital for only 3.1%
of total receipts. The relative decline in the importance of exports continued
throughout the period, falling to 66,7% in 1956-60 and to 44.5% in 1971-72.
On the other hand, the role of capital inflows increased continually, rising
from 24.1% in 1956-60 to 47.7% in 1971-72.
The relative importance of the categories of total expenditure of foreign
exchange show greater stability once the initial reorientation towards
foreign remittances had taken place. From the period 1956-60 to the present,
the share of merchandise imports in total expenditure has held steady between
56-58%, while the remittances of capital, although rising from 4.7% in 1948-52,
35have never accounted for more than 18% in the last 15 years.
qc
This is not to say that remittances will not rise in the future, for
their increase may be delayed only as long 'as the Brazilian market continues
to expand for foreign capital. For the time being," companies may prefer to
hold their profits within Brazil to finance their own expanding operations
there. The accumulation of indebtedness, not the annual flows of its repatria
tion, would illustrate the true magnitude of potential claims of foreign interests
in the Brazilian econonQr.
T
a
b
le
I
I
.2
B
R
A
Z
IL
:
B
A
LA
N
C
E
O
F
PA
Y
M
EN
TS
,
R
E
C
E
IP
T
S
A
N
D
E
X
PE
N
D
IT
U
R
E
S
5
-Y
e
a
r
A
v
er
ag
es
T
y
p
e
o
f
R
e
c
e
ip
ts
o
r
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
M
il
li
o
n
s
o
f
d
o
ll
a
rs
(a
v
er
ag
es
fo
r
p
er
io
d
)
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
1
9
4
8
-5
2
1
9
5
6
-
6
0
1
9
6
1
-6
5
1
9
6
6
-7
0
1
9
7
1
-
7
2
1
9
4
8
-•
5
2
1
9
5
6
-•
6
0
1
9
6
1
-6
5
1
9
6
6
-•
7
0
1
9
7
1
-7
2
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
T
o
ta
l
re
c
e
ip
ts
1
4
7
7
2
0
0
1
2
1
1
7
3
5
5
2
7
7
2
6
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.0
T
O
O
.0
1
0
0
.0
E
x
p
o
rt
s
(f
.o
.b
.)
1
3
6
6
1
3
3
4
1
4
1
0
2
0
6
5
3
4
3
5
9
2
.
5
6
6
.
7
6
6
.6
5
8
.
1
4
4
.5
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
6
1
1
7
0
1
2
2
2
4
0
5
0
3
4
,
1
8
.
•i
5
.8
6
.
8
6
.5
D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
3
1
4
5
7
8
9
1
0
1
0
.
2
0
.
7
2
.3
2
.
5
1
.3
C
a
p
it
a
l
4
7
4
8
3
5
2
8
1
1
5
8
3
6
8
7
3
.
2
2
4
.
1
2
4
.9
3
2
.
6
4
7
.7
T
o
ta
l
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
1
7
0
4
2
0
9
1
2
0
5
6
3
2
3
1
6
4
5
5
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.0
Im
p
o
rt
s
(f
.o
.b
.)
1
2
3
8
1
2
0
3
1
1
8
3
1
8
2
0
3
7
3
5
7
2
.
6
5
7
.
5
7
.5
S
5
7
.9
S
e
r
v
ic
e
s
3
8
0
5
4
6
4
9
4
8
6
3
1
5
9
7
2
2
.
3
2
6
.
1
2
4
.0
2
6
.
7
2
4
.7
D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
6
2
4
1
3
4
3
9
0
0
.
4
1
.
1
0
.6
1
.
3
1
.4
C
a
p
it
a
l
8
0
3
1
8
3
6
6
5
0
5
1
0
3
3
4
.
7
1
5
.
3
1
7
.8
1
5
.
6
1
6
.0
S
o
u
rc
es
:
19
48
-6
0
fr
om
EC
LA
,
o
p
,
c
it
..
T
ab
le
2
,
p
.
1
5
.
1
9
5
9
-7
2
,
s
e
e
so
u
rc
e
s
to
T
a
b
le
I
I
.3
.
F
o
r
A
n
n
u
al
S
e
ri
e
s
,
se
e
T
a
b
le
II
.3
.
T
o
c
a
l
R
e
c
e
ip
ts
M
il
li
o
n
s
d
£
T
a
b
le
I
I
.3
B
R
A
Z
IL
:
B
A
LA
N
C
E
O
F
PA
Y
M
EN
TS
,
R
E
C
E
IP
T
S
A
N
D
EX
PE
N
D
IT
U
R
ES
A
n
n
u
a
l
S
e
r
ie
s
E
x
p
o
rt
s
(
f
.o
.b
.)
S
e
rv
ic
e
s
D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
C
a
p
it
a
l
T
o
ta
l
E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
Im
p
o
rt
s
(
f
.o
.b
.)
S
e
r
v
ic
e
s
D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
C
a
p
it
a
l
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
$
Z
$
Z
$
Z
$
Z
$
Z
$
Z
$
z
$
z
$
z
1
9
5
9
.
.
.
2
0
2
1
1
0
0
1
2
8
2
6
3
.4
1
5
9
7
.9
1
1
0
.5
5
6
9
2
8
.2
2
1
5
0
1
0
0
1
2
1
0
5
6
.3
5
3
2
2
4
.7
2
1
1
.0
3
8
7
1
8
.0
1
9
6
0
.
.
, .
..
1
9
5
8
1
0
0
1
2
6
9
6
4
.8
1
7
5
8
.9
1
0
0
.5
5
0
4
2
5
.7
2
4
1
5
1
0
0
1
2
9
3
5
3
.5
6
4
6
2
6
.8
2
5
1
.0
4
5
1
1
8
.7
1
9
6
1
.
.
.
2
3
2
3
1
0
0
1
4
0
3
6
0
.4
1
1
9
5
.1
2
1
0
.9
7
8
0
3
3
.6
2
2
1
6
1
0
0
1
2
9
2
5
8
.3
5
2
4
2
3
.6
1
7
0
.8
3
8
3
1
7
.3
1
9
6
2
.
.
, .
.
.
1
9
3
3
1
0
0
1
2
1
4
6
2
.8
7
8
4
.0
5
6
2
.9
5
8
5
3
0
.3
2
1
3
7
1
0
0
1
3
0
4
6
1
.0
4
8
5
2
2
.7
1
8
0
.1
3
3
0
1
5
.4
1
9
6
3
.
1
0
0
1
4
0
6
7
2
.1
1
2
2
6
.3
5
6
2
.9
3
6
7
1
8
.8
2
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
2
9
4
6
1
.3
4
2
0
1
9
.9
1
7
0
.8
3
7
9
1
8
.0
1
9
6
4
.
.
.
.
.
2
0
1
6
1
0
0
1
4
3
0
7
0
.9
1
2
8
6
.4
6
8
3
.4
3
9
0
1
9
.4
1
8
2
2
1
0
0
1
0
8
6
5
9
.6
4
3
3
2
3
.8
5
0
.3
2
9
8
1
6
.4
1
9
6
5
.
1
0
0
1
5
9
6
6
7
.7
1
6
1
6
.8
8
5
3
.6
5
1
7
2
1
.9
1
9
9
7
1
0
0
9
4
1
4
7
.1
6
0
8
3
0
.5
1
0
0
.5
4
3
8
2
1
.9
1
9
6
6
.
.
1
0
0
1
7
4
1
6
5
.2
1
4
1
5
.3
9
3
3
.5
6
9
7
2
6
.1
2
5
0
0
1
0
0
1
3
0
3
5
2
.1
6
9
1
2
7
.6
1
4
0
.6
4
9
2
1
9
.7
1
9
6
7
,.
.
.
.
2
5
9
1
1
0
0
16
54
®
6
3
.8
1
8
5
7
.1
1
0
7
4
.1
6
4
5
2
4
.9
2
8
0
5
1
0
0
1
4
4
1
5
1
.4
7
5
2
2
6
.8
3
0
1
.1
5
8
2
2
0
.8
1
9
6
8
..
.
.
3
5
1
9
1
0
0
1
8
8
1
5
3
.5
2
0
5
5
.8
7
5
2
.1
1
3
5
8
3
8
.6
2
9
1
7
1
0
0
1
8
5
5
6
3
.6
7
6
1
2
6
.1
5
3
1
.8
2
4
8
8
.5
1
9
6
9
.
.
.
.
.
4
0
7
3
1
0
0
2
3
1
1
5
6
.7
2
9
0
7
.1
8
2
2
.0
1
3
9
0
3
4
.1
3
4
8
3
1
0
0
1
9
9
3
5
7
.2
9
2
0
2
6
.4
5
1
1
.5
4
1
9
1
4
.9
1
9
7
0
,
1
0
0
2
7
3
9
5
5
.8
3
7
8
7
.7
8
7
1
.8
1
7
0
1
3
4
.7
4
4
5
2
1
0
0
2
5
0
7
5
6
.3
1
1
9
3
2
6
.8
6
6
1
.5
6
8
6
1
5
.4
1
9
7
1
.
1
0
0
2
8
8
2
4
7
.9
4
4
3
7
.4
9
5
1
.6
2
5
9
7
4
3
.2
5
5
7
7
1
0
0
3
2
4
5
5
8
.2
1
4
0
1
2
5
.1
8
1
1
.5
8
5
0
1
5
.2
1
9
7
2
3
..
.
.
.
9
4
3
3
1
0
0
3
9
8
7
4
2
.3
5
6
2
6
.0
1
0
7
1
.1
4
7
7
7
5
0
.6
7
3
3
1
1
0
0
4
2
2
4
5
7
.6
1
7
9
3
2
4
.5
9
9
1
.4
1
2
1
5
1
6
.6
^P
re
li
m
in
ar
y
O
J
t
o
33
Another once-compelling fear which, at least temporarily, has been set
aside, has to do with the expectation that heavy and rising financial payments,
coupled with the necessity of so-called "fixed imports" such as fuels and
wheat, would claim increasing shares of foreign earnings and on the use of
capital flows. Maria ConceipSo Tavares had noted that by 1960 the balances of
foreign exchange "available" for imports of non-essential goods and services
had been reduced from 75% to 31% of all export earnings (see Table II.4, col. 10)
Thus the relative failure of exports, the rising share of necessary intermediate
goods, and the growing burden of financial obligations, all left little room
for the flexible disposition of foreign exchange.
In the decade of the 1960*s, however, the export performance continued to
y
be erratic, dipping in 1962 but resuming a steady upward climb thereafter.
Contrary to the early trend noted by the ECLA researchers, the level of
"necessary" imports, (fuels, wheat and newsprint in Table 11.4, col. 2-5),
failed to continue to rise at the same pace and never exceeded $500 million
36
despite the continual growth of the overall economy.
The increase in financial payments, however, did continue (col. 8), sur-
37
passing the $600 million mark by 1966 and trebling again by 1972, Thus, the
absolute balances of foreign exchange available after deductions for "required"
imports and financial obligations (col. 9) indicate that the peak level of
uncommitted reserves actually reached $1 billion in 1952, 1954, and again in
1968, although the high proportions which the unobligated export earnings
Perhaps other goods may now be actually "necessary" and nonsubstitutable,
such as fertilizers and certain metals, such as copper, not found in Brazil.
37 The lone dip in 1968 in financial payments seems due to the low level of
amortization of balance of payments loans incurred in an earlier era. By
1969, financial payments surpassed the $1 billion level, offset by still-
rising levels of export earnings.
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represented in the late 1940*s (66-75%) have never again been achieved even in
the most recent period.
In summary, at least two factors appear to be at work in the later period.
The heavy imports of capital continue to offset the remittances of earnings of
previously-imported capital as well as the negative balance on current accounts.
In the most recent years, the combined circumstances of rising export earnings
and the aggressive inflows of international capital have both pried open an
economy which, by the necessity of the trade imbalances of earlier periods,
had been sealing itself off from the international spheres.
On reflection, Brazil has seen at least two totally different responses
to periods of severe negative balances in the current accounts. The major
variable has not been the magnitude of the import constraint, but rather,
the flexibility with which the national economy has met the so-called bottleneck,
In the 1950's and early 1960*s, internal politics favored national accumulation
and capitalist growth with a major emphasis on protecting the internal market
by erecting trade barriers. In the current period, even greater deficits in
current accounts are quite cavalierly balanced by welcomed inflows of noncom
pensatory capital. Thus in name only does the balance of payments appear
to serve as the external sector's rationalization for domestic policies. The
balance of payments acts as a "cover" (to borrow again from the vocabulary of
espionage) for broad ranges of policies and crimes within the country by the
Brazilian state currently and against Brazil by other states during periods of
hostility.
The overall openness of the Brazilian economy, in view of the remarkable
growth in the last 20 years, can be measured by the overall share of imports in
gross domestic product and in total domestic supply (Table II.5). In the period
from 1948 to 1952, imports rarely composed less than 10% of GDP (col. 3) nor
less than 7.6% of total supply (col. 4). Thereafter, however, the share of
36
Table II.5
BRAZIL: OVER-ALL IMPORT COEFFICIENTS, 1948-69
(Cr$ 1,000,000 in current prices)
Supply of
Import Coefficients
Imports of Gross domestic M M
goods and domestic goods and GDP Supply
Year services product services [1+2] [1-^3]
1948 22.1 166.2 216.7 13.3 10.2
1949 22.0 195.8 251.9 11.2 8.7
1950 22,3 232.7 294.4 9.6 7.6
1951 41.0 270.9 263.7 15.1 15.6
1952 40.0 337.3 437.3 11.9 9.4
1953 28.8 398.8 498.3 7.2 5.8
1954 49.6 523.4 677.0 9.5 7.3
1955 56.3 665.3 839.7 8.5 6.7
1956 62.8 839.6 1,058.7 7.5 5.9
1957 81.8 1,025.4 1,299.8 8.0 6.3
1958 97.0 1,199.5 1,554,5 8.1 6.2
1959 152.7 1,615.6 2,141.9 9.5 7.1
1960 202.8 2,245.8 2,958.3 9.0 6.9
1961 300.1 3,379.9 4,352.2 8.9 6.9
1962 445.8 5,532.7 7,047.2 8.1 6.3
1963 1,206.7 10,016.6 13,135.3 12.1 9.2
1964 1,476.1 19,082.6 24,531.1 7.7 6.0
1965 2.305.0 30,147.1 39,122.6 7.7 5.9
1966 3,625.6 42.905.5 57,349.7 8.5 6.3
1967 4,786.0 57,972.7 76,272.3 8.3 6.3
1968 7,551.0 78,280.9 107,430.8 9.7 7.0
1969^ 10,049.8 103,682.7 143,166.7 9.7 7.0
Sources: IBGE, Anuario Estadistico do Brasil.
Preliminary estimates
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imports in GDP never rose above 10% nor less than 7% of GDP, except during the
1963 recession. Only in the three most recent years (1967-69) has the import
share begun again to rise persistently, but still never exceeding 10% of GDP
or 7% of total supply.
Compared to the growth of national income and its components (Table II.6)
overall import capacity has actually grown relatively little. The index of
import capacity (col. 11) doubled from 1948 to 1969 compared to the four-fold
growth in personal and government consumption (columns 2 and 5) and the
three-fold growth in gross fixed capital formation (col. 9). Even the most
recent high annual growth rates (7-12%) of import capacity.in 1966-69 are
closely matched by the annual growth rate of gross national income (columns 12
and 15). (See also Table II.7 for detailed categories.)
Imports, despite their temporary release from the earlier rigid bottle
neck, have thus far failed to regain their prominent share of the earlier period.
The structures "created during the era of active import substitution have resisted
the direct penetration of international trade, as carried on in the old mode,
of overall trade flbws. Brazil, it appears, has entered a new era. Once
having successfully closed .a relatively large and dynamic econon^^ to direct
material inflows of competitive commodities, Brazil has preserved its internal
market for those same types of goods, similarly designed and produced, but
all "feito no Brasil."
B. The Rise of Merchandise Exports
We have noted in passing that the rise in merchandise exports and the
inflow of foreign capital have supported the unparalleled increase in imports
towards the end of the 1960*s. Yet the increase in export earnings is marked
by the rise of new primary exports, expanding under an umbrella of
growth on the old staples.
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Table II.7
Comparison of Indices of National Production and Imports
for Selected Broad Categories
(1948=100)
Personal
Consumption Industrial Output Capital Formation
3-Year
Averages
National
Accounts
Imports
Non-
durables
National
Accounts
Imports
Metallic
Fuels Intermed.
National
Accounts
Imports
Capital
Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1948-50 109.5 104.9 111.0 114.5 132.3 108.1 102.9
1951-53 135.7 146.7 138.8 182.6 191.1 141.8 165.4
1954-56 167.8 124.4 177.5 223.7 208.6 138.9 92.6
1957-59 197.9 92.7 233.5 220,2 153.9 176.0 135.7
1960-62 252.5 119.3 317.0 255.9 193.6 211.0 110.6
1963-65 282.0 139.5 350.6 275.9 222.1 214.3 61.6
1966-68 331.6 230.6 413.6 318.4 215.4 276.2 76.4
1969-70 - 247.9 536.0 377.5 309,9 - 137.6
1969 only 390.2 231.9 507.7 355.4 290.8 338.2 122.8
Sources: columns (1 & 6) are calculated from national accounts expenditure
categories in 1953 prices, indexed to 1948, and averaged from
IBGE, Retrospectivas, p. 216 and Anuario 1973, p. 566.
column (3) is calculated from real industrial product by activity
with Index base year changed to 1948, from IBGE, Retrospec
tivas , p. 215, and Anuario 1973, p. 566.
columns (2, 4-5, and 7) are averages from Table , the present study.
40
The doubling of total export earnings can be traced to three types of
developments. Stable prices for certain traditional exports, such as coffee,
cacao, palm oil, cotton and fruit, have led to increased earnings despite stable
export quantities. Second, world prices of certain exports rose and Brazil
increased its output as well. For example, tonnage exports of sugar doubled while
earnings quadrupled from 1968 to 1972. Third, new classes of products gained
in the Brazilian export market, such as soybeans, soybran, meats, instant
coffee, and manufactured goods such as footwear, iron and steel products,
vehicles and electrical machinery. Whether the introdution of these new exports
represents a sustained or transitory element remains to be seen, although the
substitution of commercial exports, such as peanuts and soybeans and for food
crops such as com, appears to be consistent with an overall growth strategy
favoring accumulation and international integration.
In Table II.8 the 19 major export products which are listed in order of
their importance in 1972 may be compared to their original rank in 1968
(col. 8). In 1968 the nine most important products are all primary mineral
or agricultural commodities. By 1972', however, processed and manufactured
exports have increased, especially those with agricxaltural origins. Thus
exports of meat, electrical machinery, iron and steel products, automobiles
and instant coffee, are all derivative of industries of an earlier era which
had never exported until relatively recently. Of the absolute increase in
U.S. $2,110 million in earnings from 1968 to 1972, more than 33% is accounted
for by increases in the nine traditional primary exports, 8% by hematite
exports, 16% by the new agricultural products (soybeans, instant coffee and
peanut oil), 17% by the manufactured goods shown here.^®
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Note that the 19 products listed here account for only 74% of the
increase in export earnings between 1968 and 1972. The remainder consists of a
wide variety of raw materials, intermediate products and other manufactured goods.
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To conclude, the connection between increasing exports and further domestic
industry should not detain us. Surely the final entry of Brazil into the
instant coffee market in a major way has less to do with technology or learning
and everything to do with a final accommodation of power. Whatever linkages
which are now appearing in Brazil through export expansion may be coming too
little and too late. A more realistic apprehension might be the conversion
of Brazil into a kind of export platform, both of primary products of agricul
tural and mineral origin and more recently of industrial products. Although
export enclaves are more common to smaller, resource poor countries (such as
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), perhaps the example of the hybrid platform
of South Korea (which combines export manufacturing and a large and
backward agriculture) is but a hint of a possible direction for Brazilian growth.
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III. THE changing STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS
A. Basic Issues and Definitions
s
The study of Brazilian imports reflects only one dimension of the continua
tion or failure of import-substituting industrialization. Two conflicting
processes must be noted. First, the absolute level of an imported commodity
may decline over time, or second, the absolute level may increase but actually
decline relative to the total consumption of the required good. The first
process is referred to as "visible" substitution and will be studied for
1
broad groups of a sample of 500 commodities for 25 years,• The second process
is known as "relative" substitution, and its progress will be examined in a
later section by means of annual import coefficients.
While our focus begins in 1948, it may be helpful first to review quickly
the- broad history of even earlier periods of import substitution. In
studying of the 1929-48 era, Maria Concei9ao Tavares had noted the weakness
of domestic production in the consumer durables category. This is partly
explained by the simple nonexistence of many products or by the satisfaction
of those needs by domestic labor services. It appears as though labor-saving
devices (consumer durables) played little role in the Brazilian economy,
especially within the luxury-consuming classes. Only in the postwar period
did the Brazilian upperclass become treated to those commodities which later
form the basis of import substituting industry. Thus in the early phase,
imports of consumer durables which actually substituted for domestic labor
while the early industrialization of consumer nondurables was actually
undertaken from 1929-48, These goods were never to regain their importance
thereafter.
The ECLA study remarks on the stability of'imports of fuels and lubricants,
as well as of raw materials and intermediate poroducts during this period.
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These, it is explained, were essential for maintaining the ongoing industrial
plant. Only in the case of metal products is there a particialarly "visible"
import substitution which can be attributed to the opening of the Volta Redonda
steel mill in 1946 and its rolling mill in 1948.
The greatest effect of the alternating import expansion and contraction
during the early period is mirrored in the flows of capital goods. The general
openness of the capital goods sector allowed for the general expansion of other
industries "...which would otherwise have been limited...by the existing margin
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of the relative small domestic capital goods industry. Thus prior to the
postwar period, the economy had launched itself on an industrialization course
and had been reserving a quarter of its import capacity for capital goods.
In turning to the later period several hypotheses may be examined with
respect to the absolute levels of imports during the middle and late 1960*s.
One naive version would lead us to expect great surges of domestic production
of previously imported goods during periods of exchange constraint, and
symmetrically, the erosion of import substitution during the most recent
period. Thus, the invasion of foreign products and the resumption of large
scale capital imports may allow Brazilian industry to proceed into those
"higher" or more difficult stages of import substitution once thought too
remote for whatever reasons.
•s
All these hypotheses, however logical, miss the point. Tavares had
noted earlier that the role of the exchange constraint was merely to stimulate
the entire process, and it is the contribution of other observers to
reinterpret the nature of import-substituting industrialization,^^
^^ECLA [28], p. n.
40See Bergsman [7], Morley and Smith [79], Hirschman [45] and others.
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Postwar industrialization was not only intent on displacing imports and
their material components with domestic products but also expand the absolute
level of domestic production. In retrospect, the real goal was actually the
replacement of one labor- and service-intensive style of living with imports of
a set of labor-saving devices and to substitute mechanical power for human and
animal power. The real goal of industrialization of the 1950*s was to achieve
the revolution in transport, communication, power, and mass consumption
which had come to characterize "modem" urban life by the 1920's. And with its
attainment came the suppression of the handicrafts sector, larger good imports,
a taste for the new consumer life, and the recognition that export earnings
could never support the desired standard and style of living, either directly
through imports or through needed components.
In our examination of the period from 1950 to 1970, we would expect to
observe several major patterns. First, certain sectors may experience
alternating import reduction and invasion, although we expect the recovery
of imports to be countered by the organized resistance of domestic producers.
Second, we would expect the increase of token imports in the still
highly-protected industries to serve as standards to domestic producers
for further imitation. Third, the flows of certain key intermediate
goods needed by all of industry may prove indifferent to the overall import
constraint.
I
With the removal of any exchange constraints towards the end of the period,
we would expect that an Increase in certain categories of international
goods, newly engineered or newly invented, to revive the life style for the
upper class. In this sense, the importation of assembled automobiles, which
in recent years has quantitatively never evoked a wink from domestic producers,
has merely served to date the local models as inferior and outmoded. Upper-
class needs are satisfied in part by imports; middleclass needs are met by the
46
domestic reproduction of somewhat outdated vintages, and the poor are left
either outside the sphere of commodity consumption or with goods which are
traded-in or cast-off by other users or with new but cheapened versions tailored
for the mass market.
In this examination of imports from 1950 through 1970. then, we intend to
examine the importance of structural changes in contrast to the cyclical swings
imposed by exchange constraints. We proceed in this inquiry first in the study
of the absolute level and composition of imports and then comparison with the
dynamic changes of national industry.
B. The Flow of Imports
!• the overall picture
The period from 1948-70 witnessed rapid and widely swinging import cycles.
The xmport peak, as calculated in constant prices of 1955, had been reached
in 1951, and was quickly followed by a sudden downward swing in 1953. With the
exception of the sharp increase in 1954. the next four years portray an uneven
but gradual recovery, leading into a plateau until 1963. (See Figure III.l.)
The precipitous slide from this tenuous plateau which beg^ in 1964 reached
rock bottom by 1965 at a level of imports only slightly higher than the 1949
starting point and marks a watershed in both political and economic structure.
The economic ascent which began in 1966 soon surpassed all previous records by
1969 and still continues upward.
Our cursory comparison above (Section II.B) of the general decline in
Import capacity would lead us to discard out of hand the hypothesis of wholesale
import invasion in the most recent period. We turn, therefore, to an examination
of different categories of imports and their reflection of the transformation
of the Brazilian economic structure.
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The value of imports from 1948-70 by major categories is presented in
Table 111,1 and their indices in Table III.2 and Figure III.2. (Note that in
the latter figure, the profile of the sample total appears in subfigure B,
charted along the same axis as nondurable consumer goods for the years 1960-70.)
Of the six broad categories of commodities, the index of durable consumer
imports, which by 1970 had fallen to less than one third its 1948 level,
reveals the greatest impact of displacement. Having reached an absolute low
in 1965, consumer durables imports have since recovered steadily. While this
upsurge of consumer durable imports may not have threatened the domestic
industry, its more significant role may have been as a demonstrator of new
commodities, tantalizingly diffusing the new products of European and
North American consumerism.
Imports of nondurable consumer goods (Table III.2) rose steadily from
1948 to 1952, then declined until 1959 to a 25-year low, and then rose continu
ously and persistently all during the early 1960's despite other difficulties
in national production. Apparently, imports of consumer nondurables, mainly
food and medicine, were not restricted during this era, and thus the great
import substituting success of durable consumer goods forms a counterpoint to
the almost comical neglect in the field of consumer nondurables.
Imports of fuels and lubricants (Table III.2 and Figure III.2,c) had been
regarded by ECLA as one of those rigid bottlenecks to be faced squarely by
the late-1960's. With the rise of energy-intensive industry in Brazil and the
failure to exploit domestic oil resources, we might have expected a relatively
sharp and persistent rise of imported fuels throughout the period. Even
during the relatively tight years of the middle-1950's. imports of fuels had
increased, doubling the 1948 level by 1954. During the ensuing 20 years,
imports of fuels have risen more slowly, surpassing the 1948 level three-fold
by 1964-65 and four-fold by 1970. Thus this broad category of fuels, while
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subject to Import substitution within its products, still remains a relatively
open sector reflecting the failure of visible import substitution.
The apparent violent fluctuations of imports of metallic raw materials
and intermediate products mirror the fundamental changes in domestic structure.
Import peaks had been reached in 1951, 1954, 1963, and again in 1970. The
variation in these imports corresponds to certain factors of world—wide supply,
such as shipping shortages and the Korean War, but more importantly, to the
creation of the domestic iron and steel industry in Brazil. The apparent
volatility of imports in this category actually reflects the successive creation
and augmentation of domestic capacity and the rapid growth of domestic demand.
The lack of progress in the import substitution of nonmetallic intermediate
products stands in relation to the success of metallic Intermediate goods much
as the failure of nondurables substitution contrasts with the successful import
reduction of durable consumer goods. Again, the apparent oscillations in these
imports corresponds to the alternating periods of the establishment of import-
competing industries and then their failure to satisfy growing domestic demand.
Since imports of this category include such necessities as processed and semi-
processed food, wood, chemicals and paper, the overall import constraint has
never been allowed to reduce this sector's inflows.
The wide swings in the nonmetallic intermediate imports contrasts with
the rather sharp and well-defined movements of capital goods imports. Imports
of capital goods reach successive peaks in 1952 and 1959, and then plunge con
tinuously downward until 1965, reaching a trough at less than one half the 1948
level. During the ensuing recovery, the slowness with which imports of capital
goods have surpassed earlier peaks may testify to the competitive resiliency
and adaptiveness of the domestic capital goods industry—or to changes in the
composition of the industry which are not captured in the import index.
41
See Baer [2] on the history of the Brazilian steel industry.
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Another perspective on the relative importance of each class of imports
to the total stream is provided by the percentage breakdown of imports between
major categories (see Table III.3 and Figure III.3), In the division of the
sample, we note that the import share of consumer durables, which had accounted
for nearly 10% of total imports in 1948, has never amounted to more than 1.6%
of total Imports in the last 20 years. Indeed, Maria Conceiijao Tavares had
already pointed out in the early 1960*s the realistic limits on how much
further the share of imported durables could be reduced. Imports of consumer
nondurables, on the other hand, had accounted for 7i3% in the early period,
rose to nearly 14% in 1967, and fell to 8.6% In 1970.
The threat of an" increasingly larger import share for fuels and lubricants
continued tmtil 1965 when fuel imports accounted for 31.5% of the total.
However, in the period thereafter, fuel imports have fallen steadily, and by
1970 accounted for nearly 23%. Thus the threat that imports of fuels would
soon absorb the total import capacity has never materialized.
Imports of metallic intermediate goods had accounted for 8.4% of imports
and after some variation, achieved a peak share of 15% in 1963, and have
stabilized at 10% of the total in the most recent years. Similarly, the import
share of nonmetallic intermediate imports varies from 25% in 1948-50 to 35%
in 1968 and declines to 31.5% thereafter.
The import share of capital' goods which once consisted of nearly 38% of
total imports in the early period, continued to be reduced throughout the two
decades. The share of capital goods reached its lowest point during the
recession years of 1964-65 with 16-18% of total imports and has risen steadily,
currently occupying more than 26% of all imports. This resumption of the
relative importance of capital goods imports may suggest the new international
division of labor in which the older capital goods are produced in Brazil by
established companies while new machinery, required by the expanding foreign-owned
T
A
B
L
E
I
I
I
.
3
P
E
R
C
E
N
T
A
G
E
B
R
E
A
K
D
O
W
N
O
F
IM
P
O
R
T
S
B
Y
M
A
JO
R
C
A
T
E
G
O
R
IE
S
,
1
9
4
8
- -
1
9
7
0
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
G
o
o
d
s
F
u
e
ls
&
R
a
w
M
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
&
I
n
te
r
m
e
d
ia
te
P
r
o
d
u
c
ts
C
a
p
it
a
l
S
a
m
p
le
D
u
ra
b
le
N
o
n
-
d
u
r
a
b
le
L
u
b
r
ic
a
n
ts
M
e
ta
ll
ic
N
o
n
-
m
e
ta
ll
ic
G
o
o
d
s
T
o
ta
l
1
9
4
8
-5
0
8
.1
7
.3
1
3
.4
8
.4
2
5
.1
3
7
.7
1
0
0
1
9
5
1
-5
3
5
.8
6
.9
1
4
.9
8
,4
2
4
.4
3
9
.6
1
0
0
1
9
5
4
-5
6
2
.0
7
.3
2
1
.9
1
0
.8
2
9
.9
2
8
.0
1
0
0
1
9
5
7
-5
9
2
.0
5
.1
2
0
.0
7
.8
2
6
.1
3
9
.0
1
0
0
1
9
6
0
1
.4
5
.6
2
2
.2
8
.3
2
9
.1
3
3
.4
1
0
0
1
9
6
1
1
.2
6
.2
2
2
.7
9
,5
2
8
.8
3
1
.6
1
0
0
1
9
6
2
1
.0
7
.0
2
5
.1
1
0
.3
3
0
.3
2
6
.2
1
0
0
1
9
6
3
1
.1
7
.3
2
4
.7
1
4
.9
2
9
.0
2
3
.0
1
0
0
1
9
6
4
,8
8
.4
3
0
.5
1
0
.2
3
2
.1
1
7
.9
1
0
0
1
9
6
5
.8
9
.4
3
1
.5
1
0
.6
3
2
.1
1
5
.5
1
0
0
1
9
6
6
.9
9
.5
2
8
.3
1
1
.4
3
1
.6
1
8
.3
1
0
0
1
9
6
7
.9
1
3
.9
2
5
.2
9
.1
3
1
.7
1
9
.0
1
0
0
1
9
6
8
1
.4
9
.6
2
5
.8
8
.3
3
5
.1
1
9
.8
1
0
0
1
9
6
9
1
.2
8
.9
2
3
.6
1
0
.2
3
1
.4
2
4
.7
1
0
0
1
9
7
0
1
.6
8
.6
2
2
.6
9
.9
3
1
.3
2
6
.0
1
0
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
1
9
4
8
-
1
9
6
1
--
6
1
,
E
C
L
A
,
•7
0,
IB
G
E
,
T
a
b
le
9
A
,
p
.
22
sa
ii
5>
le
(d
at
a
in
d
o
ll
a
rs
a
t
19
55
p
ri
c
e
s)
u
t
1
u 8
0
-
y
o
"
6
0
-
o S
50
t-
o O
S
P
U
t+
O
.
3
0
.
.
2
0
..
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
T
a
b
le
I
I
I
.
3
1
0
F
ig
u
re
I
I
I
.3
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
B
re
ak
d
o
w
n
o
f
Im
p
o
rt
s
b
y
M
a
jo
r
C
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
,
1
9
6
0
-1
9
7
0
C
a
p
it
a
l
G
o
o
d
s
R
I
—
T
-
R
O
N
o
n
m
e
ta
ll
ic
I
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
ts L
u
b
r
ic
a
n
ts
N
o
n
d
u
r
a
b
le
C
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
G
o
o
d
s
(D
u
ra
b
le
C
o
n
su
m
er
G
o
o
d
s)
1
0
0 41
-
9
0
-
8
0
-
7
0
-
6
0
-
5
0
-
4
0
-
3
0
-
2
0
-
1
0
h
i
w o z
^
> O c
u
56
plants and export enclaves are still produced abroad and enter with the
assistance of foreign capital.
The rise in the shares of intermediate goods and a continued significance
of consumer nondurable imports had led Maria Concei^ao Tavares to remark on the
continued vulnerability of the Brazilian economy despite the fanfared success
of the import substitution process. In dividing imports into type of use and
destination, (ECLA study. Tables 10 and 11) the author had attempted to trace
the share of imports as to their ultimate end product. Although this method
is relatively crude compared to input-output techniques, she roughly concluded
that the share of imports used ultimately for consumption had risen from 52%
to 58% during the early period she had examined, while the share of Imports for
investment had declined from 48% to 42%. In one sense, capital formation was
treated as incidental to the process of industrialization, while the immediate
goal was the direct production of consumer goods. Imports were to be used to
sustain the consumption process, not to restrict it in favor of accumulation
and deferred consxjmption.
Thus the important link between imports and domestic consumption still had
not been broken but had been rendered slightly more circuitous. That automo
biles are assembled in Brazil did not reduce the necessity for imports of copper
and steel products. The establishment of bakeries nearer the Brazilian markets
in no way reduces the need for imports of wheat. Thus the shifts in the import
schedules is mere higgling and haggling by international capital on the territorial
division of productive stages, not the attainment of self-sufficiency. "The
maintenance of existing industrial activity itself would remain strategically
dependent upon mass imports of raw materials," Maria Concei^ao Tavares had
remarked in 1964, foreshadowing the crisis that was already in process. Only
the recent redirection of imports and the export succcess which now allows more
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slack in the import process permits current observers to ignore the continuing
underlying dependence on imports for the day-to-day survival of the Brazilian
economy.
2. a detailed examination
Broad movements of the general import categories disguises those critical
changes within«specific groups of commodities. Here we investigate the changing
levels and shares of some important subgroups of imports. The detailed annual
series are presented in Appendix Tables 1-7; only in the accompanying Table III.4
do we summarize for three separate three-year periods the growth of imports
and their share of the sample or group totals.
The overall rise of nondurable consumer imports (Table III.4, category 1.0)
consists for the most part in the continued dependence on food imports which
reflects the priority of encouraging export agriculture rather than food
crops. In addition, the surprising rise of drug and medical imports (1.3)
reflects the subordination of the Brazilian market to international pharmaceuti
cal companies; the continued rise of books, newspapers, and magazine imports
(1.4) may reflect the prolonged cultural dependence of Brazilian intellectual
and academic life on foreign sources. Nevertheless, the reduction of imports
of beverages, textiles, and miscellaneous goods has been sustained although
their further reduction would prove difficult.
The overall decline in the importance of consumer durables (category 2.0)
demonstrates the most singular sustained success of visible import substitution.
Indeed, this sector has received the benefit of high levels of tariff and
exchange rate protection, in addition to considerable direct promotion. As a
consequence, the index of automobile imports and accessories (category 2,1) fell
from 80.3 in the 1948-50 period to 7.4 in 1968-70 or from 52.4% to 15.5% of all
durables imports. The two other groups in this category, household
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Table III.4
liBport Indices and Shares by Groups of CoDmodlties, 1948-70
Index of ImporCs
(igAS'-lOO)
Share of Sample or
Group
1968-50 1960-62 1968-70 1948-50 1960-62 1968-70
1 l.O Non^durable consumer soods 104.9 119.3 244.3 7.3 6.3 9.0
I.l Foodstuffs 116.4 149.5 276.8 60.6 68.7 62.3
1.2 Beverages 59.5 16.8 25.4 6.6 1.9 1.2
I. 3 Drugs 131.2 225.6 680.2 13.0 19.5 28.7
1.4 Textiles 98.7 3.8 7.2 9.9 3.0 0.3
1.5 Books, newspapers, 100.1 181.9 282.8 5.2 8.3 6.2
periodicals
1.6 Hlsrellanentifl 59.3 20.8 38.3 4.7 1.3 1.2
1 2.0 Durable consumer Eoods 87.9 17.7 29.1 8.1 1.2 1.4 1
2.1 Vehicles and Accessories 80.3 11.4 52.4 34.7 15.5
2.2 Household appliances and 94.0 27.7 44.7 29.0 44.0 42.1
accessories
2.3 Miscellaneous 102.7 23.6 81.7 18.6 21.3 42.4
3,0 Fuels, lubricants and 114.5 256.0 373.3 13.4 23.3 24.0
oetroleuio derivatives
3.1 ^1 fuels 111.1 248.0 339.5 81.7 79.1 74.0
3.1 1 Coal 93.7 81.8 . 155.1 18.1 7.0 9.8
3.1 2.1 Crude petroleum - (169,6277(304.907)^ - 64,7 84.8
3.1 2.2 Gasoline 118.4 75.3 34.1 46.6 13.3 4.5
3.1 2.3 Fuel oil 112.4 106.1 n.d. 35.2 15,0 n.d.
3.2 Lubricants 101.0 205.0 333.9 10.3 9.0 10.0
3.3 Other derivatives 121.0 418.9 801.5 8.0 11.9 15.9
4.0 Intermediate metallic 132.3 193.6 280.3 8.4 9.4 9.5
products
4.1 All semi-processed 158.2 307.0 453.7 38.7 52.1 54.7
4.1 1 Ferroue, semi-processed 133.6 107.5 213.8 5.5 3.0 4.0
4.1 2 Non-ferrous, semi- 163.1 346.3 500.9 33.2 49.1 50.6
processed
4.1 2.1 Copper producta 155.1 280.8 384.2 21.7 27.0 26.3
4.1 2.2 Aluminum products 120,7 372.4 776.6 4.1 8.3 12.2
4.1 2.3 Zinc products (1.296)a - - - 9.4 8.9
4.2 All processed metallic 119.4 137.7 195.0 61.3 47.9 45.3
products
4.2 1 Ferrous, processed 119.5 156.0 212.6 53.4 47.3 43.1
4.2 1.1 Iron and steel piste (1382)8 - - 1.5 17.3 25.9
and sheet
4.2 1.2 Tin plate 79.6 79.1 59.6 14.3 9.4 4.7
4.2 1.3 Barbed wire and 238.5 360.3 211.8 7.9 8.5 3.7
staples for fencing
4.2 2 Non-ferrous, processed 119.3 14.2 76.3 7.9 6.0 2.2
5.0 Non-metallic raw materials 115.4 179.0 281.3 25.1 29.4 32.6
and intermediate products
5.1 All raw materials 173.2 466.7 519.3 53.4 57.9 41.3
5.1 1 Wheat 253.8 660.2 747.4 23.3 40.9 29.8
5,2 Semi-processed intarocdiate 92.8 62.5 165.1 50.6 21.4 36.0
5.2 2 Wood 188.9 161.1 133.3 8.2 4.6 2.4
5.2 6 Chemicals and 125.0 149.0 285.4 14.8 11.3 13.9
pharmaceuticsls
5.3 Processed intermediate 114.9 227.2 395.6 16.0 20.7 22.7
products
5.3 2 Chemical fertilizers, 161.9 461.9 1285.7 4.0 7.7 13.6
Insecticides, etc.
5.3 3 Paper 95.2 257.1 257.1 5.0 8.5 5.4
1 6.0 Capital Koods 102.9 110.7 122.6 37.7 30.4 23.5
6.1 Agricultural equipment 191.4 24.2 46.7 12.3 1.5 2.6
6.2 Equipment for specific 103.7 102.9 98.4 14.0 13.5 11.4
Industries
6.3 Electrical mschinery and 96.1 146.8 201.2 10.4 15.0 18.2
appliances
6.4 Transport machinery and 77.6 67.5 58.5 29.6 22.9 17.6
equipment •
6.5 Miscellaneous machinery 118.5 179.0 208.1 33.6 47.2 50.2
and equipment
7.0 Sample Total 107.6 142.9 203.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
Nucea: a. Given in value, 1948 iii^>ortB were negligible-
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appliances and miscellaneous durables, demonstrate absolute Import decline
by 1960-62, but their level and import shares recover in the closing years.
Imports of fuel and oil derivatives (categories 3.0-3.3) show mixed
evidence of successful import substitution. It has been noted above (section
III.B.l) that the share of this entire category in total imports had grovm
nearly four-fold from its 1948 levels, or form 13% to 24^ of total imports.
Here we note that three major subdivisions comprise the group. The share of all
solid and liquid fuels comprises nearly three-quarters of the total group,
while lubricants and other derivatives comprise the remaining shares.
Within the fuels subdivision, imports of coal have declined absolutely
until 1963 and have risen thereafter, corresponding to the drop in the
required use of domestic coal in metallurgical processes. The rise of crude
petroleum imports and the decline of imports of gasoline and fuel oil reflect
the entry of Petrobras into domestic production and its failure to discover
and exploit extensive oil reserves.
The overall rise in the index and share of intermediate metallic imports
veils the dramatic changes that have been occurring in the metal-working
/ O
industries. A certain pattern of inverted symmetry may be noted between
imports of nonferrous semiprocessed (4.1,2) and ferrous processed (4.2.1)
materials. The rise in both the absolute indices and relative shares of
nonferrous semi processed metals reflects the continued failure to discover
national reserves of copper, aluminum, and zinc in the face of the tremendous
expansion of the electrical equipment and automobile industries. The decline
in the share of processed ferrous metallic products (category 4,2.1) occurs
^ 2
The distincution between semi-processed, which indicates raw materials
at early states of production, and processed metallic goods may be somewhat
arbitrary, especially in view of the observation that "processed" steel is
imported in order to be reprocessed. See Baer [2 ].
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despite its rising absolute levels, especially in imports of iron and steel
plate and sheet (category 4.2.1.1). However, import substitution of tin plate
and barbed wire and staples (categories 4.2.1.2-3) has continued and can be
seen in the absolute reduction of those imports.
The single largest and growing category of imports remains nonmetallic
raw materials and intermediate products (category 5.0). An examination of
three levels of processing within this category reveals mixed evidence on the
success of import substitution. Imports of raw materials have risen more than
five-fold, while imports of processed intermediate products have risen nearly
four-fold during the entire period. Imports of semiprocessed intermediate
goods, mainly wood and chemicals, have also increased, although less rapidly.
At first glance it may seem ironic that wheat imports have grown at the same
time as chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and fimgicides. Nevertheless, xn
expanding export agriculture and neglecting domestic production of food
stuffs, Brazil has opted to use its foreign exchange earnings to promote even
further earnings and supply its food needs from abroad.
The relatively slow growth of the capital goods sector and its decline
as a share of total imports, reflect the domestic growth of the capital goods
industry in general. Absolute imports of agricultural equipment and of trans
port machinery and equipment have fallen the most dramatically, while equipment
for specific industries has remained stable. Imports of electrical machinery
and appliances, and similarly miscellaneous machinery, have more than doubled
43
since 1948-50.
cannot be overemphasized that some of those observations may reflect
the failure of the import sample to include a number of new commodities which
have been unimportant or nonexistent until recently.
It is interesting tliat the proportional change in the composition of capital
goods also reflects some of the imbalances noted above. Note that the rise in
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To summarize, the sample total reflects a two-fold increase in overall
imports during a period when the industrial econony grew by more than five
times. We suspect that despite the shifting between classes of imports,
the role in the econonor of certain import categories may have declined
considerably, while the shares of certain critical inputs, such as fertilizers
t
and crude oil, have actually increased not because of the workings of comparative
advantage but because of the sheer success at import-substituting industrializa
tion. With this in mind, we turn now.to a consideration of imports insofar as
they may be compared to domestic output.
D. Comparisons of Imports and Domestic Production
The•comparison of the growth of imports and domestic production may shed
light on the progress of relative import substitution. The rising absolute
value of certain imports in fact corresponds to a relative decline in the
import coefficient in light of the rapid growth of domestic production. Here
we summarize the growth of apparent consumption and imports of a number of
products, in a later section, we compare the industrial import coefficients
for the twenty-two year period.
Fuels: coal, coke and oil derivatives. Despite the rising need for
low-ash metallurgical coal, the overall share of imports in coal consumption
has remained relatively stable over the past 13 years, mainly due to the 40%
electrical machinery includes motors and generators, communications machinery,
equipment for motors and other electrical appliances. The miscellaneous
category, which also indicates substantial absolute and share increases, includes
machinery for heavy metal transforming, medium and light equipment, typewriters,
and scientific apparatus. The decline in imports of agricultural equipment
contrasts with the rise in fertilizer imports, but further investigation of the
modernization of Brazilian agriculture must be known before the apparent
imbalances in the application of these inputs may be evaluated.
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requirement for domestic coal in steel inaking.^^ Brazilian production of coal
for steam generation has also double<i and this accounts for the overall lowering
of the import coefficient. In recent years, however, the lifting of the domestic
requirement for coal in steel-making has encouraged the rise in imports of
coke (see table 111.5, lines A.1-2 and Appendix Tables 8 and 9 for annual series),
The profile of domestic production and import shares for crude petroleum
(Table III.5, line A.3) reflects the early entry of Petrobras into the refining
industry, its need for crude peteroleum, and the expansion of the industry in
the face of the failure to encounter low^cost reserves of domestic crude.
Only in 1955 and 1958 did Brazil Import nearly all of its crude needs, and
had by 1967 reduced the import share to nearly half Its needs. Thereafter,
imports as a share of consumption have risen steadily to nearly 76% in 1972
(see Appendix Table 10 for the detailed annual series). Domestic exploitation
has failed to keep up xdLth needs. Efforts to displace imports of some major
petroleum products have been more successful in the cases of automobile
gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel oil, and less in the case of liquified gas
whose apparent consumption rose nearly five times from 1959 to 1972 (see
Appendix Table 11 for annual series of petroleum products).
Metallic Intern^diate Products. The rise of imports of semi finished
steel in the end of the 1960's (Table III.5, line B.l), may reflect the excess
See Baer [2], chapter 1. Baer also remarks that the major obstacle to
the early growth of the steel industry in the 19th century was the "free
access to the Brazilian market under treaty rights granted to England by
Joao XI." (p. 52.) He notes several attempts throughout the 19th century to
set up Catalan forges and blast furnaces, but competition from the British
led to the failure of these early enterprises. (n. 18, p. 54), supporting
speculation made earlier in this paper which regards the middle 20th century
as the concluding era of colonial openness.
A.
B.
C.
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Table III.5
Import Coefficients for Selected Products
Apparent Consumption Import Coefficient
1950-52 1960-62 1970-72 1950-•52 1960-62 1970-72
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuels
1. Coal (1000 T) - 2,350 4,096 , - 41.7 39.2
2. Coke (1000 T) ^ - - 2,005 - - 6.8
3. Crude petroleum (1000 m ) 93 13,215 32,246 17. 8 58.1_ 71.6
4. Petroleum products
a. Automobile gasoline (1000 T) - 4,737 10,753 - 19.7 2.7
b. Fuel oil (1000 T) - 5,505 8,587 - 18.3 .0
c. Diesel oil (1000 T) - 3,168 7,210 - 27.6 .4
d. Liquified gas (1000 T) — 435 1,341 — 36.3 42.3
Metallic Intermediate Products
a
1. Semi-finished steel^ (1000 T) - - 267 - - 44.6^
2. Rolled steel—total^ (1000 T) 986 2,187 . 5,196 34. 0 17.6 15.9
a. Flat-rolled products 355 919 2,520 32. 9 18.1 17.9
b. Non-flat rolled 632 1,268 2,408 34. 4 17.2 11.3
3. Non-ferrous metals^ (5) (1000 T) - 152.7 270.7 - 70.6 59.0
a. Aluminum - 41.5 102.8 - 42.7 30.4
b. Lead - 25.3 33.8 - 70.0 32.4
c. Copper 39.1 67.4 - 92.5 94.0
d. Tin - 2.0 2.3 ~ 20.5 10.5
e. Zinc - 44.9 64.4 - 79.1 83.0
4. Nickel - - 305.6 - - 65.2
Non-metallic Intermediate Products
1. Paper^ (1000 T) 349 678 1,416 26. 2 24.6 14.2
2. Chemical pulp (1000 T) - 252 811 - 35.7 10.1
•3. Rubber (1000 T) - 54 162 - 61.0 18.9
4. Caustic soda (1000 T) - 194 323 - 61.1 50.0
5. Fertilizer (1000 T) - 872 3,405 - 40.6 69.9
a. Nitrogen - 280 944 - 75.0 86.0
b. Phosphates - 455 1,834 - 3.2 46.4
c. Potassium - 137 628 - 100.0 100.0
6. Wheat'^ (1000 T) — 2,690 3,696 — 75.7 63.1
Notes: a.
b.
c.
d.
In column 6,
1971.
In columns 2
In columns 3
In columns 3
average of 1970 and 1972 only. No import information for
and 5, averages are for 1960 and 1961 only.
and 6, years are 1970 and 1971 only.
and 6, years are 1968-70.
Sources: ECLA, cit., and IBGE, Anuarios, various years.
See Appendix Tables - for annual series.
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45
capability of rolling mills relative to domestic blast furnaces« Even within
the 1968-72 period, we note that Imports of semifinished steel had risen to
more than 61% of total consumption in the latest year (see Appendix Table 12).
The progress of Brazilian steelmllls is reflected in the persistent
decline of the import coefficient for rolled steel products from 34% in 1950-52
to 16% in 1970-72. (The annual series presented in Appendix Table 13 gives
annual data.) In the closing years of the period, imports actually were
increasing as a share of total supply, and the overall stability of the
import coefficient from the 1960-62 to the 1970—72 period is especially noticeable
in the case of flat-rolled products. Despite the spectacular rise of the steel
industry. Imports have not been completely displaced.
The case of nonferrous metals reveals also a high and stable share of
imports. Total apparent consumption (line B,3) has nearly doubled from the
base period 1960-62 while the overall coefficient has decKned from 71% to
59%. (The greatest decline has occurred in the most recent years. See
Appendix Table 14).
The summary of five major nonferrous metals presents quite a variety of
developments. The most striking cases of import replacement, although far
from complete, can be seen in the decline from 70% to 32% in the import shares
of lead, of aluminum from 43% to 30% and tin from 21% to 11%. Almost no
progress has been made in domestic production of copper or zinc, an observation
originally made in 1964 in the ECLA study. (See Appendix Tables 14-16 for
annual series.)
45 Earlier imports of semifinished steel may be disguised within the
statistics as flat-rolled products, as Baer remarks on the rerolling of
imported rolled products.
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Nonmetallic Intermediate Products. As new final goods are produced in
Brazil, we would expect the apparent consumption of intermediate products to
rise, and in the short run, imports of those materials. Then, as import substi
tution proceeds backwards, a reduction in the imported share of these inter
mediate goods might be expected.
Among the nonmetallic intermediate products we observe both phases of
this process. The import share of imported paper, for example, rose during
the early and middle 1950's and then fell annually to the end of the period.
The 14% import coefficient of 1970-72 which compares to 2h% twenty years
earlier demonstrates the success of the overall process.
ITie decline of paper imports also corresponds to the rise of imported
chemical pulp for the domestic production of paper. Thus beginning in 1956-60,
the import coefficient of chemical pulp (see Appendix Tables 17 and 18 for the
annual series of paper and pulp, respectively) fell steadily from 61% to 4%
in 1969. The final years of the period 1970-72 show a slight import recovery,
but still far below the import share of the earlier period.
The rise of the automobile age in Brazil has had an impact on the metallic
and nonmetallic intermediate products alike. In the 19th century, Brazil had
been one of the world's great exporters of natural rubber, but by the early
1960's, Brazil was importing between 50% and 60% of her rubber needs, mostly
in synthetic form. Only with the establishment of large scale synthetic
factories in Brazil in the late 1960*s has the import coefficient fallen from
61% in 1960-62 to 19% in the closing years, still leaving ample room for further
substitution. (See Appendix Table 19 for annual series.)
The import coefficient of caustic soda, a key raw material in the chemical
industry, has declined from 61% in 1960-62 to 50% ten years later, while the
overall fertilizer coefficient (Table III.5, line C.5.a-c) has risen from
66
40.6% in 1960-62 of total supply to nearly 70% in 1970-72.
Finally, the import coefficient for wheat has fluctuated from 85% to
51% during the period. The most recent reduction of the import share has been
accomplished in response to the application of machinery and fertilizer and
the luck of favorable weather. The persistence of the decline in the wheat
A A
coefficient remains to be seen.
Sectoral Coefficients for the Manufacturing Industries
The overall sectoral coefficients» together with distributions of imports
and national production, are compared in Table III.6 for 1949, 1958, 1961 and
1971. The most striking changes in the latest years are to be found in the
increases in the coefficients for metallurgy, electrical and communications
equipment, chemicals, and clothing. The rise in the clothing coefficient to
12.2% after a long period of virtually no imports may reflect changes in the
sample over time or the simple willingness of consumers to pay the 155% tariff
for imported synthetics from Italy, scarves from Japan, and an item listed as
"used clothing," most probably prewashed jeans, from the U.S. Declines in the
import coefficient continue in metal-processing, transport equipment, and
rubber.''*^
Conclusions
Our examination of the role of import displacement leads us to the
conclusion that there is still plenty of room for further import substitution.
The predictions of the limited size and scale of the market, technological
'^ ^•See Appendix Table 20 for annual series on caustic soda, Table 21 for
fertilizers, and Table 22 for wheat.
'^ ^Note that the 1971 coefficients were calculated by a 100% reclassifica-
tion of imports into the industrial categories. Data for earlier years
reflects the ECLA sample. The 1971 results are presented in Table 111.7.
These census industries and their corresponding imports differ in coverage from
those individual activities explored earlier.
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difficulties, or raw material scarcities have all proved to be of little
consequence. Rather, the major constraint has proved to be the availability
of international financing during the downward swings of export earnings. The
dependence of the Brazilian economy on critical imports such as food, copper,
and fuels, persists, and it is therefore a question of how to sustain the
flow of these goods and hence Brazil's sensitivity to international pressures.
Some of the old bottlenecks in the Brazilian economy have been widened
considerably, others remain with some adaptation and substitution. But it
must be repeated that the national development program never had as its goal
self-sufficiency or real economic autonomy. The mere domestic reproduction
of previously imported goods using foreign technology in itself need not deepen
international interdependence unless certain key material inputs cannot be
found locally or adapted. Is it not difficult to argue that in the light of
the reduced import share in total supply, pressures on those imports are
sufficient to plunge the economy into a major tailspin?
The reduction of overall import coefficients needs not be the issue. The
general style of development, Brazil's imitation of foreign consumption
patterns, the prospect of severing the few open channels and isolating Brazil
even further (the prospect of which seemed very real in the early 1960*s),
all may lead to a perception of real or fancied dependence of the Brazilian
economy on the international sector. Thus it is not hard to see how an inter
national financial blockade against Brazil, its "loss" of credit ranking and
the hostility of private capital coinciding with a downswing in its own
industrial cycle, led to the conditions precipitating the military takeover in
1964.
In many ways Brazil of 1975 is setting herself up for a new round of
import substitution, if that be the expected response to the next wave of
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import constraints. Should the circumstances arise again, the paths out of the
crisis, as formulated by Maria Concei9ao Tavares ten years ago, may still be
relevant today, although some of the alternatives have become politically
remote.
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IV. IMPORT BEHAVIOR, 1953-70*
A. Introduction
An econometric summary of recent Brazilian import behavior is of critical
interest on at least two accounts. First, the very formulation and investiga
tion of the relevant price and import series for the long periods of time yield
in and of themselves an important quantitative r^sumS of Brazilian industrializa
tion. Second, the econometric estimation of Brazilian import equations may
assist in predicting the expected trade imbalances under different anticipated
conditions of relative inflation and growth.
The utility of import elasticities as a predictor of trade imbalances
relies on the sjnnmetry of both import and export elasticities taken together,
as in recent studies by Houthakker and Magee'^ ^ [46] and Khan [57], and on the
assumptions of conditions of growth and inflation in Brazil and its trading
partners.
The repeated experience of Brazil with trade imbalances would lead us to
conclude beforehand that exports appear to have grown relatively slowly with
*This paper was actually begun in July, 1966, when the author collaborated
with Paul G. Clark in a summer research prqject released as Clark and
Weisskoff [18]. In the early foundation work, we should like to thank Drs.
Miranda Altamira of SNR, Cori Acioli of SEEF, Paulo ttonteiro of CACEX, and
Jos^ Bastos Tavora of IBGE for supporting the data seeking and processing
phases. We are also indebted to Dra Maria da Concei9ao Tavares of CEPAL,
Drs. Joaquin Mangia of CPA, Angelo de Souza of FGV, Graciano Sa and Sam Morley,
both then of EPEA, and special thanks to Dr. Everaldo da Silva, then of U.S.
AID and currently with the BNH.
The updating of the fundamental work could not have been accomplished
without the continuing cooperation and kind enthusiasm of Dr. Tavora of the
IBGE and Paul Clark of Williams ^College and the patience of Antonio da Cunha
and Judy Golden in New Haven, Connecticut, and Juan Allende in Ames, Iowa.
'^ ^These authors, in hyperbolic understatement, remark that "the export
equations are not without interest." Their findings for Brazil will be
examined in the conclusions of this paper.
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respect to world demand and have responded sluggishly to price changes.
Declines in the world price of sugar, coffee, and cocoa have played havoc with
Brazilian exchange earnings, while price recoveries alone have generated
bouyant surpluses.
On the import side, periods of internal recession have resulted in some
diminution of import demand, especially capital goods, while such necessities
as fuels and noiimetallic intermediate products have not been permitted to fall
despite the exchange squeeze. Imports of capital goods and consumer durables
have responded rapidly and vibrantly during periods of economic expansion.
When temporary export failure has coincided with domestic expansion, then the
pressure on the balance of payments led to the rationing of forei^ exchange
among those categories of goods deemed essential to the development process.
Thus, the auction systein of the early 1950*s (see Kafka [56]) and its later
consolidation into simpler multiple exchange rates have all served to maintain
the steady flow of so-called basic goods and raise the price of unnecessary
goods. The cheapening of foreign exchange by the ready manipulation of both
exchange costs and tariffs has served to distribute the much reduced import
capacity among priority needs. We are saying, therefore, that we expect
considerable variation in the price and income variables to be critical in
determining the distribution of imports on a disaggregated level.
But if a relative price variable helps to allocate import capacity between
different categories of needs, then of what significance is the elasticity of
import demand with respect to overall price of imports relative to domestic
prices? We have noted earlier that the connection between imports and lagged
exports may not be as mechanical or as rigid as previously supposed,
especially in a country receptive to foreign capital flows or successful in
obtaining generous balance—of—pa3nnents loans. Hence, we expect the overall
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price elasticity to reflect the responsiveness of general•preferences for foreign
imports and competitiveness of the overall domestic supply.
B. Models and Data
1. the general relationship
Two standard import models will be applied to Brazil, the log-transformations-
[equation 1] assume a multiplicative interaction between the independent variables,
while the linear form [equation 3] assumes directly additive effects,
[1] M = A • K . P . e
t Jt Jt
j = 1, .... 9 and t = 1953, ..., 1970.
Where is merchandise imports for nine use classes in current dollars;
is gross capital formation, or another relevant income variable, in billion
cruzeiros (Cr$) given in constant 1953 prices; P is the ratio of the import
price index to domestic price index explained below; x is simply a time trend
variable, 1952=0, and w is the error term assumed to be log—normally
J
distributed with zero mean and unit variance, and ^2^ are the elasticities
of imports for the use classes with respect to capital formation and price,
respectively, and *^3j> is the percentage change in imports with respect to
time, a measure of the import substitution trend. The log-log estimating
form is simply:
[2] log log log P.^ +"3^ t +
where u^^ is the error term assumed normally distributed.
The untransformed or direct form is thus:
"jt " ®0J ®lj * ^2j ®3j •'jt' ^oj ^ constant;
®lj' ^2j' ®3j coefficients of capital formation, price and time,
respectively. The error terms, is assumed distributed normally with zero
mean and unit variance.
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2. the Import variable
A sample of 472 commodities for 1948 to 1970 are divided into nine use
classes. The broad use classes and some representative commodities appear in
Chart IV.1 (and their average 1961 tariff in parenthesis alongside). Annual
import quantities were converted to U.S. dollar values at constant 1955 prices,
following the sampling methodology initiated by ECLA [28] and maintained by the
IBGE.
3. the Income variable
Gross fixed capital formation (KAPFORM) has served as the income variable
(K^) in the model in view of its logical and direct link, with industry-
building and import needs. The more conventional income variables* such as
total or sectoral GDP generally move smoothly but erratically upward. Other
relevant income variables have been substituted for capial formation on the
grounds that they function as more appropriate import generators or as import
anticipators, such as construction permits in the case of imports of construc
tion materials. In the category of fuels (class 3), domestic oil production
was added to the equation as a proxy for the progress of local competitive
substitutes.
4. the overall price variable
The price variable (P.^) is constructed to represent that price which
an importer must fact for a commodity which is comparable to and competitive
with domestic goods. In Brazil the dollar price of imports rose or fell
relative to inflating domestic prices depending on several factors which will
be examined here for each commodity in our sample for each of the 18 years.
First, the exchange rate for different categories of goods varied, at times
weekly, monthly, or annually. Second, commodities were moved into different
exchange categories depending on their administrative priority, and varying
amounts of foreign exchange for the importation of those goods could be
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Chart IV.1
Use Classes and Some Commodities
for Import Sample
(average 1961 tariff in parentheses)
Class 1; Nondurable Consumer Goods (commodities //1-67, 471-2)
Whiskey, champagne, aperitifs (150); wines, mirrors, linens (120); grapes,
raisins, nuts (60); vitamins (11); live plants (10); breeding horses (0).
Class 2: Durable Consumer Goods (#68-106 & 330)
Radio-phonographs, motorcycles, lamps, harmonicas (100); passenger cars (80);
cameras (20).
Class 3: Fuels (iyi07-118)
Airplane gasoline (150); kerosene (85); crude oil, diesel fuel, fuel oil (20)
Class 4; Metallic Intermediate Goods (y/119-141)
Rolled sheet, iron and steel; aluminum plate; lead and alloys (50); wire (40);
tin (25); nickel and alloys (16).
Class 5: Nonmetalllc Intermediate Goods (#142-277)
Cellophane, paperboard (80); false teeth (60); caustic soda (30); wheat,
insecticides, herbicides, DDT, and newsprint (0).
Class 6: Construction Materials (#278-300)
White cement (100); tubes, elevators (80); angles (50); glass plate (40);
wiring (38); asphalt (30).
Class 7: Capital Equipment for Agriculture (#301-3]9)
Cultivators, compressors (23); seed planters (20); breeding stock, cattle
and sheep, barbed wire (0).
Class 8: Capital Equipment for Industry (#320-438)
Motors (77); generators (70); transformers (61); diesel engines (57);
boilers (45); road building equipment (22); turbines (10); oil drilling
equipment (2), plus all kinds of machines, meters, and apparatus.
Class 9: Capital Equipment for Transport and Communication (#439-470)
Radiators (120); tires and tubes (100); jeeps, buses, radiotelephone equip
ment (80); diesel motors for vehicles (70); trucks (43); trolleys (30);
steam and diesel locomotives (20).
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purchased only in the relevant auction category.Third, tariffs also were
raised or lowered on specific commodities and on entire groups throughout the
period. Thus if we are willing to assume stable GIF import prices in dollars,
then, in the first analysis, the cost of imports and their fluctuations can be
traced directly to three sources for each commodity: first, changes in the
relevant exchange rate; second, shifts in commodities between exchange categories;
third, changes in the tariff rates and their exceptions.
The principle we have consistently applied is designed to measure that total
or combined premium which an importer must pay over and above the price of a
duty-free good purchased at the basic exchange rate, which is called here the
"comprehensive rate of protection,It is the combined effect of changes
in the basic exchange rate modified by the comprehensive rate of protection
C O
which we will compare to the domestic prices of competitive commodities.
5. the price of imports
The price variable is calculated as the ratio of the index of the
import price P and the index of the domestic price for each use class
®jt jt
^^isee Kafka [56], Huddle [50], Clark-Weisskoff [l8], and the Appendix to
this paper.
^^During the period studied here, the exchange categories have been
reduced from five to two and eventually to a single import rate, while the
levels and range of protective duties have also been reduced. See Appendix
for detailed statements and data.
^^In our 1967 paper, Clark and I had named this the "effective rate of
protection" as a mark of the true barrier of the exchange rate costs added
to the protective tariffs. Since this term has since come to denote the total
levels of direct and indirect protection in the input-output sense, I have
substituted "comprehensive protection" here.
52Some improvements in this methodology may be made by also considering
the wholesale price indices of exports and of transport rates and their
variations during the period. In addition, a number of port and excise
charges may have been differentially applied to different commodities during
the period as well. However, these refinements for specific years have been
left to other investigators.
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j and year t. The import price itself is the product of the index of compre
hensive rate of prtoection for each use class for each year, and the index
of basic exchange rate r^^ for the corresponding use class in the corresponding
year, relative to the base year 1953. The import price index is calculated:
[4] (P ) = (1 + E).. r = [A] - [B]
™ At ^(1 + E)^53 rj^2
where the factor [A] is the index of the comprehensive rate of protection by
use class and year and [B] is the index of the basic exchange rate by use class
and year.
The comprehensive rate of protection for each use class (1 + is
calculated as the average of levels of protection for each of the commodities
in that use class, weighted by imports of those commodities in 1962. This
year was chosen as a representative middle year of somewhat normal import
flows.
[5] (1 + = I ^±e2 ^ ®^it * i = 1» *472, j =1, 9,
^ °^i62 and t = 1953, .... 1970.
The combined tariff-and-exchange protection for each conimodity, (1 +
is a kind of molecular building block of the import price and is itself
con^osed of several atoms. One of these atoms is the relevant tariff t^, which
applies to each of these commodities for each year. The average commodity
tariff itself is constructed of particles, as the unweighted average of items
and subitems in the tariff schedule which vary from one to twenty items per
import commodity. Thus,
[6] t^ = Z: a^^ , k = 1, ,.., n
k
n i = 1, ..., 472
where t^ is the "adjusted" average tariff on each commodity and a^^ is each item
in the tariff schedules (MCT) which correspond to the commodity (CEPAL-NBM). The
annual average commodity tariff, also is altered to the extent that the
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item tariffs, changed by administrative decree or waiver. Note that
only the item tariff is what the importer pays for a line item in the'tariff
code. Our commodity tariff t^ is a synthetic atom, artificially constructed to
correspond to the import commodity flows.
Finally, the relevant exchange rate for each of the sample commodities,
for each year is calculated as the simple unweighted average of the exchange
rates of the constituent items and subitems,
[7] 2 k = 1, ..., n
i = 1, ..., 472
In practice, importers do not even pay the item tariff, as a percentage
tax on the current cruzeiro import price. Rather, the tariff was actually
applied to the cruzeiro value of the import at an altogether different exchange
rate, called the "fiscal dollar," which generally lagged behind the basic
exchange rate determined administratively or in the auction. If ^ is the basic
exchange rate; the commodity tariff rate; f^ the "fiscal dollar" rate', and
the exchange rate at which foreign currency was ,bought to Import commodity
then the comprehensive rate of exchange-and-tariff protection per commodity,
expressed as a percentage of its dollar GIF price and relative to a tariff-free
good entering at the basic rate, can be written;
for i = 1, ..,, 472
t = 1953, .... 1970.
[8] (1 + e)^ = t. e.1
53A series of annual commodity ratios, [f/r] and [e./r] were calculated
first so that changes in the commodity-tariff, t. could fee isolated. Thus a
commodity characterized by a zero tariff and "privileged" exchange rate, e. < r,
actually is subject to a negative rate of protection or is subsidized compared
to another tariff-free good brought in at the basic exchange rate, i.e., when
= r. See the Appendix for these ratios.
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6. domestic prices
Domestic prices of competitive goods were calculated in two ways. For
four of the nine use classes, annual wholesale price series for 87 conmiodities
could be compared to the imports and thse prices were weighted by the
corresponding imports in 1962,
[9] ,(P^) = ^ m.g2 i •••i 87
jt i
2 3 ~ classes 1, 3, 4, 5
and (Pj) is the domestic price index for use class i; PT is the domestic
d.t xt
price of commodity in year _t, weighted by commodity import in 1962.
Wholesale prices indices for the remaining five use classes were taken from
the already-constructed FGV series which corresponded to the import commodities,
(See the bibliography and Appendix for sources.)
Each of the above steps could be handled under different assumptions,
leading to different estimates. In our calculation, commodity tariffs have
been adjusted for across-the-board waivers or reductions for each commodity
during the time period. However, numerous other tariff exemptions abound, such
as specially-negotiated LAFTA exemptions and imports for specific development
projects or agencies. The tariff we have estimated represents the posted or
anticipated premium which the importer must expect to pay if he decides to buy
abroad rather than locally.
Since large quantities of imports eventually do enter subject to all sorts
of waivers, the actual "collected duties" represent but a fraction of the
duties expected from the hypothetical use class tariff, which itself is a
weighted average of commodities and a simple average by tariff items. Morley [75],
in following my worksheets, adjusted the aggregated or "posted" tariffs down
ward to calculate- an "actual" or "paid" tariff, which is some fraction of the
original tariff. Quite naturally, highly-protected goods are not very popular
in any given year, and therefore, we would expect the "tariff take" to be
but a portion of the real tariff. Thus, the downward adjustments to the
aggregate tariff by its iterative reconciliation with collected duties under
estimates the real price of imports relative to competitive domestic goods.
Other adjustments for domestic excise taxes have been made also by Bergsman [ 8]»
All this is of little consequence in the final price variable if the changes
in real or the adjusted tariffs follow the same course.
To suiomarize:
•p
m
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(1 + E).^
^ = [A_] . [V^^](1 + E) • r,.. * (P,) jf jt
jt ^ j53
J ® !•> •*•» 9
c = 1953 1970,
The first factor on the right hand side, the index of the comprehensive
rate of protection, given in Appendix Table 3. The second factor
is the index of the basic exchange rate divided by the index of domestic prices
for each use class. This factor appears in Appendix Table 5, called
the "partial price variable." The total price variable, given in
Appendix Table 6.
7. data
Needless to say, the sheer discovery, gathering, and processing of the
data represented an extensive and tedious venture through the nxnnerical
labyrinth of 18 years of Brazilian import policy, sifting through the mazes of
statistical information available in the various agenecies. It remains here
to be noted that the search for special exchange rates took this investigator
to the subterranean archives of the Superintendency of Money and Credit (SIM)C)
in the Banco do Brasil, and the search for comprehensive tariffs, their
administrative changes and exemptions, to lofty offices of the Council on Tariff
Policy (CPA) of the Finance Ministry and to the waterfront Dispatching Authority,
Tlie import series of 472 commodities was provided by the IBGE Statistical
Laboratory and the domestic commodity prices by the Getulio Vargas Foundation.
The enormous card and arithmetic operations were performed at the now-defunct
Praia Vermelha computing facility of the Brazilian Census Bureau with programming
assistance provided by the Finance Ministry's Statistical Service (SEEF). The
entire data processing effort turned out to be an overwhelming feat of collaboration
by many agencies and individuals of an otherwise impossible research adventure.
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Figure IV.1
Imports, Relative Price, and Capital Formation
Brazil, 1953-1970
1954 56 58 60 62 6if 66 68 70
Gross Capital Formation
[NCr$ 72-202 xlO^ at
constant 1953 prices]
Imports of Consumer Goods
[US$ 72-371 xlO^
at current prices]
Relative Price of
Consumer Goods
[index .96-2.10]
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C. Results
The estimated import elasticities from the double-logarithmic model
(Equation 3) are presented in Table IV.1 and the coefficients of the untrans—
CC 2
formed or direct form in Table IV.2. The estimates of R indicate acceptable
fits with the exceptions of imports of fuel (the equation must be discarded)
and capital goods for agriculture. The low Durbin-Watson statistic in the
first four equations (total imports and the three groupings of consumer goods)
may be caused by the omission of dynamic factors noted by Houthakker-Magee.
Especially in the case of consumer goods, the replacement of imports by domestic
industry in the early time period may have given rise to positive serial
correlation in the error term. A habit formation model for consumer nondurables
and durables, combined with a more complete econometric description of the
process of import displacement, would undoubtedly reduce the autocorrelation
in these equations. The high D-W statistics for the remaining categories (with
the exception of capital goods for industry) suggest that a more volatile stock
adjustment model would be appropriate for these classes of imports.
Of the eleven equations estimated in Table IV,1, the import elasticities
with respect to income (or in this case, capital formation) are significant
in six instances, and range from 1.80 for overall inqjorts to 5.52 for imports
of capital equipment for transportation. The price coefficients are almost
all significant, negative and, for the most part, inelastic, especially in
the cases of overall imports and two categories of capital goods. The unit
price elasticities for consumer nondurables and construction materials reflect
the resistance of these sectors to sustained import displacement.
^^Note that the numbers in parentheses represent t-ratios.
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The coefficient of the time trend is both significant and negative for the
overall import equation, indicating an annual import decline of 8.5% during
the total period. Especially high negative time trends for consumer durables,
construction materials, and the three categories of capital goods reflect the
high rates of growth of the new industries described earlier in this paper.
The weighted sum of the income elasticities (fuels excluded) equal almost
precisely the income elasticity of overall imports. The weighted price elasti
cities sum to a slightly higher value than the price elasticity for the total
imports, and this might be due to the wide fluctuations of a number of
important components,
Some substitutions for the KAPFORM variable are presented in the estimates
of the untransformed variables presented in Table IV.2. For the category of
metallic intermediate imports (line 4b), GDP generated by industry yields a
significant coefficient, and its inclusion corrects for the negative serial
correlation of the error term. The inclusion of new construction permits
(line 6a and b) to explain imports of construction materials results in an
inferior fit and a similar reversal in the direction of the serial correlation
as well. This type of change may be expected to occur if the newly-substituted
variables themselves follow rather than precede the swings in the Brazilian
import cycle. Thus, changes in GDP generated by industry, for example, may
follow changes in capital formation, just as new construction permits belatedly
respond to changes in overall capital formation.
The regression of capital goods imports on gross capital formation would
lead us to expect obvious collinearity between the independent variable and the
error term, unless capital goods imports compose but a small and differently
fluctuating component of total capital formation. This may in fact be close to
the truth when imports of capital goods are compared to the mass of residential
construction and the considerable domestic goods industry.
1
.
T
o
ta
l
Im
p
o
rt
s
2
.
A
ll
C
on
su
ff
li
er
G
o
o
d
s
3
.
F
u
e
ls
4.
M
et
al
li
c
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
(a
)
G
o
o
d
s
(b
)
5
.
N
o
n
-M
et
al
li
c
In
te
rm
e-
(a
)
d
ia
te
G
oo
ds
(e
x
c
l.
w
h
ea
t) (b
)
6.
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
M
at
er
ia
ls
(a
)
(b
)
7
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
G
oo
ds
fo
r
A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
re
8
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
G
oo
ds
fo
r
In
d
u
s
tr
y
9
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
G
o
o
d
s
fo
r
T
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
T
a
b
le
IV
.
2
Im
p
o
rt
D
em
an
d
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
,
N
o
n
-l
o
g
F
or
m
(A
n
n
u
al
D
at
a,
1
9
5
3
-7
1
)
C
a
p
it
a
l
O
th
e
r
r2
D
.W
.
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t
F
o
r
m
a
ti
o
n
P
r
i
c
e
T
im
e
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(S
.E
.E
.)
(F
-S
ta
ti
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
1
8
6
.9
0
2
3
.0
9
*
-
2
4
8
.7
8
-
1
1
1
.5
6
*
.9
2
9
2
.0
7
(.
7
2
)
(9
.1
0
)
(2
.2
8
)
(-
6
.5
3
)
(1
1
4
.4
)
(7
5
.5
8
)
2
5
.2
3
2
.8
3
*
-
7
1
.3
3
*
-
1
2
.0
8
.7
9
1
1
.7
5
(.
4
2
)
(4
.1
2
)
(3
.2
7
)
(2
.5
0
)
(3
3
.0
2
)
(2
2
.4
3
)
D
o
m
e
s
ti
c
O
il
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
1
2
5
.0
0
*
2
.0
4
*
—
—
-
.0
3
2
*
.5
0
1
1
.3
6
(3
.8
9
)
(4
.3
6
)
(4
.1
4
)
(1
9
.6
6
)
(9
.5
3
)
3
4
.8
5
1
.9
9
-
7
0
.0
9
*
-
6
.7
3
.8
4
2
2
.3
0
(.
7
2
)
(3
.7
5
)
(3
.3
1
)
(1
.8
3
)
(2
5
.8
1
)
(3
1
.2
9
1
2
1
.6
0
G
D
P
-I
n
d
u
st
ry
—
-
8
3
.2
2
*
—
.4
8
*
.7
8
7
1
.8
7
(2
.9
1
)
(3
.5
1
)
(4
.5
7
)
(2
9
.9
9
)
(3
2
.4
5
)
2
7
5
.2
2
.7
5
-1
7
7
,3
9
-
9
.7
5
.6
3
1
2
.5
3
(1
.6
9
)
(1
.8
1
)
(2
.1
2
)
(0
.9
3
)
(7
3
.5
3
)
(1
0
.6
9
)
1
8
1
.3
*
—
—
1
5
.4
8
*
.4
3
3
1
.9
1
(4
.0
4
)
(3
.7
4
)
(9
1
.1
8
)
(1
3
.9
7
)
1
8
.9
4
1
.4
1
*
-
4
0
.4
6
-
8
.5
1
*
.8
0
1
2
.2
1
(.
5
1
)
(4
.4
6
)
(2
.5
3
)
(4
.2
9
)
(1
3
.3
4
)
(2
3
.7
5
)
9
1
.1
9
C
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
P
e
r
m
it
s
-
6
6
.5
5
*
-
1
.1
7
.5
8
.6
6
5
1
.8
3
(2
.4
2
)
(3
.6
7
)
(1
.1
1
)
(2
.4
8
)
(1
7
.2
8
)
(1
2
.2
6
)
1
5
.3
5
1
.1
0
*
-
1
7
.1
5
-
6
.1
9
.4
5
7
2
.7
9
(.
4
6
)
(3
.0
6
)
(1
.2
1
)
(2
.4
1
)
(1
6
.9
6
)
(5
.7
8
)
-
2
7
2
.8
7
.9
5
*
-
5
.4
7
-
3
6
.7
2
*
.9
4
2
2
.0
8
(2
.9
1
)
(1
0
.8
8
)
(.
1
1
)
(7
.6
7
)
(3
3
.2
5
)
(9
2
.7
7
)
-
2
3
0
.8
3
.7
2
7
*
1
2
6
.3
2
3
.6
3
*
.4
0
1
1
.3
6
(1
.7
9
)
(3
.5
8
)
(2
.0
2
)
(3
.5
1
)
(4
6
.6
6
)
(4
.7
9
)
0
0
L
n
86
The KAPFORM coefficients themselves are all significant except for the
nonmetallic intermediate equation (lines 5a and b). The price coefficients
are all of the correct sign, except for capital equipment for transport, which
is insignificant. The time trend is both significant and negative for the
overall import equation and for two categories of capital equipment.
The estimates presented here of import elasticities compare favorably to
earlier estimates of similar models (Table IV,3, Panel C), although the original
Clark-Weisskoff estimates refer to a shorter time period and some of the income
data have been since revised. Although no significance tests on the differences
between the two sets of coefficients have been undertaken, the earlier
Clark-Weisskoff capital coefficients are less elastic, the price
elasticities are stronger, and the time trend weaker than the updated
coefficients (Panel B).
The remaining entries of Table IV.3 allow us to compare other import
investigations with our own current estimates. Fishlow's estimates of total
imports based on the log-log form for the period 1920-39 (Panel D) indicates a
similar income and price elasticity, although he has found lower income elasti
cities for the subcategories of imports. The estimates by Huddle (Panel E)
which use monthly exchange data for 1953-57 specifically exclude any income
variable, and his price elasticities for comparable categories, while not strictly
comparable, are higher,
Houthakker and Magee in a comparable import model for the United States
from 1947-66 find a slightly lower overall long-run income and a higher price
elasticity than the Brazilian case (Panels A and F), While the differences
between the two nations economies are indeed vast, several elasticities are
surprisingly similar, especially the income coefficients for consumer durables
and metallic intermediates materials and the price coefficients of consumer
nondurables and nonmetallic intermediate imports.
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The elasticities which had been estimated from 1953-65 data and presented
in Panel C of Table IV.3 had been used in 1966 to forecast 1970 imports under
differing expectations of growth rates and tariff liberalization policies.
(See Clark and Weisskoff [18], pp. 20, 55-57.) These 1970 projections, which
are reproduced in columns 3-4 of Table IV.4, assumed a 7% growth rate, further
import liberalization, and continued import substitution and understate the actual
1970 import recovery by only 12%. The most accurate use class projections
had been made in the cases of fuels and metallic intermediate goods, and the
greatest underestimates in consumer goods, nonmetallic intermediate and construc-
materials, those very categories which reflect a serious setback for the import
substitution process in the most recent years. On the other hand, the generous
overprediction of continued imports in wheat, and capital equipment for
agriculture and transport may reflect unexpected gains made by domestic produc
tion due to the aggressiveness of domestic industry or the receptiveness of
Brazil to international capital.
The retrospective success of import forecasting on the basis of these
long-run time series reflects both the continuity of the underlying structure
and the budget-like constraint imposed on imports as a whole, at least during
the earlier time period. Hopefully the study of demand elasticities with.
proper attention to price and import-substitution coefficients may prove a more
fruitful area of research than the more traditional study of expenditure and
price elasticities—and lend itself to greater policy urgency.
D. Conclusions
The comparison of the sets of import elasticities estimated here for all of
Brazil (Table IV.5, lines a-b) with the export elasticities estimated by
^^See R. Weisskoff [103].
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Table IV.5
Summary of Overall Trade Prospects for Brazil
Elasticities
Income Price
(a) 1.80
(b) .95
(c) 34
(d) .11
(e) .45
-.42
-.36
-.39
-1.69
-.08
Time Source and Technique
-.085 This report, log-log
-.035 Clark-Weisskoff, direct form
Houthakker-Magee, log-log
Khan, log-log, 2-stage
least squares
Imports, 1951-69 (f) .15 -1.32 -1.15'
Exports (g) .57 -.13 -.24^
Khan, log-log, "disequilibriuni'
2-stage least squares
Notes: a. Coefficients of lagged imports.
Sources: line c from Houthakker-Magee [46], Table 3, p. 115
lines d-g from Khan [ 57], Table 1, p. 688-9.
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Houthakker and Magee (line c) suggests that an unlikely prospect for balanced
Brazilian trade even should Brazilian rates of growth and inflation slow down
to equal those of the rest of the world. If, however, we expect the Brazilian
miracle to continue and if we take the higher income elasticity (Table IV.5, line a)
as the more probable of the two income coefficients, then the balance of payments
prospects are not at all encouraging.
We conclude, not unexpectedly, that Brazil is likely to continue running
trade imbalances which can be easily offset by large inflows of foreign capital.
Another alternative, though hardly likely under the current regime, is to
resuscitate some of the import-replacing policies, especially involving fuels,
foodstuffs and capital equipment, and turn perhaps for the first time to a
conscious policy of greater self-reliance.
58
It is striking that the price elasticities for both imports and exports
are about equal.
Khan's coefficients are almost the reverse of ours. His income elasticities
of demand for exports are higher and the price elasticities of demand for imports
much lower. However, Khan, in following the Houthakker-Magee procedure, has
taken no account of changing tariffs and exchange rates in any of the price of
imports variables.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Has the process of import substitution come to an end, as it was supposed,
in the stagnation and crisis of the early 1960's, which then gave way to the
Brazilian "miracle" with the disappearance of the external restriction? We
have seen the process known as import substitution as a closure on the last
remnants of colonial openness, as the domestic achievement of a life style, once
replete with imported commodities, now sustained by imports of intermediate
materials, technology, and foreign capital. The more recent paraphernalia
of Western consumerism need no longer be imported before becoming candidates
for domestic industry. They can be produced immediately by the Brazilian sub
sidiary relatively soon after their successful market debut in the wealthier
countries.
The record presented in this study documents the maintenance of import
barriers; import displacement continues despite major changes in overall
policy. Imports of many categories of consumer goods, although increasing,
remain a low share of total supply. Domestic replacement of imported
petroleum products and capital goods proceeds on its course, but now sup
plemented, by considerable inflows of crude oil and new machinery. Perhaps
these too are to be substituted in a later era. Only the imports of inter
mediate goods have noticeably risen. In the case of wheat, no major program
has set the domestic production of foodstuffs as a national priority, and
imports of processed and semiprocessed metals continue to grow with the general
level of prosperity and the absence of certain mineral discoveries. At this
point, the newly-created industrial titans walk tall behind Brazil's tariff
walls. Autos, electrical equipment, and chemicals hold their own, courtesy
of the decisions made in Brasilia, Sao Paulo, and Corporate Headquarters,
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whsrever they may be.
We are reminded of the two important phases in the postwar development
of Brazil. In the first phase, Brazil effectively bound by a severe import
constraint and an almost xenophobic distaste for foreign enterprise, favored
the promotion of national industry rather than modify its apparent consumption
standard. With the continued early failure of export earnings to keep pace
with economic growth, Brazil had turned inward toward its own production in
order to maintain a form of life to which its leading class had already become
accustomed. Several ways out were attempted. The technology of the foreign
enterprise and the consequence of foreign ownership was accepted in certain
sectors like automobiles, or, alternatively, entire markets were reserved for
the national entrepreneur, as in the case of paper, or for the state, as in
the case of petroleum. At the same time, however, the civilian regime was
being forced to attend to social and regional demands, intervene in wage settle
ments, and push overall social investment—all with a view toward the next
59
election.
The unwillingness of the state to admit large scale inflows of foreign
capital restrictedthe alternatives in forced internal accumulation and public
borrowing from foreign governments or multinational institutions. But the
suspicion of private foreign capital was as shortlived as the civilian regime.
The second phase began with the new approaches taken by the military after
1964. Cautious af first, private foreign'capital waited several years to see
That the constitution required a literacy test for the electorate im
plied that entire sections of the newly-urbanized areas would be enfranchised
with the expansion of primary schooling. Thus populist politicians pulled for
wider coverage of public education at least at the elementary level.
The Congress was also responsible for expenditures on roads and electric power
during this period, and sought fresh solutions to the periodic Northeast
droughts. See Skidmore [9] and Weisskoff and Blau EL04].
94
how the large "official" inflows of the U.S. AID loans would be received and
for the economy to stabilize economically and politically. The unanimous
applause of the multilateral agencies once earned. Western capital rediscovered
Brazil with a vengeance. When the short lived recession finally turned to
boom and the "investment climate" (as the vocabulary goes) warmed, private
investment returned. The pressure of local wages by the military, the out
lawing of labor disputes., and the termination of effective civilian rule, all
contributed through their impact on the income distribution to both a higher
rate of accumulation and higher levels of spending on durables by the newly
enriched classes who "pay'vd" the thoroughfare for the Brazilian "miracle."
The Brazilian market for automobiles, said to be saturated with four
companies producing 100,000 units per year in 1964, continues absorbing fresh
capital and enterprise from America, Japan, and Western Europe alike. By 1972,
Brazil was producing more than 500,000 cars, ranging from mini-sports cars to
large sedans.
The impulse which may have been so critical to the early postwar phase of
import substitutions may be no longer needed under current conditions. Once
the import constraint has been loosened, however temporarily and the critics
of foreign control muffled, then the state is open to wider lattitudes of
policies. The difficulties inherent in continuing on the import substituting
track can be postponed by the continual skewing of real income to those classes
which already consume the larger part of these markets. This familiar solution
to the stagnationist delimma is, of course, not reserved for the developing
countries alone.
The threat of excess capacity and eventual market saturation can be tackled
in several ways without resorting to social transformations which may jeopardize
the existing status quo. Any commodity, say automobiles or refrigerators, may
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be cheapened and the market amply widened. Simultaneously, the growth of the
real wealth of the upper class may itself lead to a deepening of the market
for newly-designed luxury goods, lending a vitality of fresh luxury demand.
Both of these effects have certainly been critical in the dynamic growth of
North American industry since World War I. But the precise formulation and
calibration of this model's consumption patterns and their implied industrial
linkages is only now being undertaken in Brazil.
If the process of import substitution, as Marfa ConceiQap Tavares had
written ten years ago, is one of internal development stimulated by external
limitations on trade, then Brazilian development in no way is to be confused
with a striving for self-sufficiency of industrial autonomy. The process may
have proved to be, as Hirschman has written, "inward-looking," but a facsimile
of an outward pattern. The touted industrial diversification of Brazil is a
domestic replica of a "would-be" pattern of imports.
Much debated at the present is the proposition that Brazil's industrial
growth has in fact led to greater dependence on external sources, both for
living style, ideas, know-how, and cash. The exchange constraint is but one
of the restrictions cast aside as Brazil has moved to integrate itself more
fully into Western production. From its past as a rubbert exporter, Brazil
imports less than half of its sjmthetic rubber (and some natural latex as well),
not to mention the imports of crude petroleum it needs to make the rest. Brazil
once exported rice and corn, yet now imports large quantities of wheat and
rice annually. Brazil exports frozen meat and lobster, luxury foods, and soybean
meal and cotton, cash crops, but imports dried codfish and powdered milk as lower-
class foodstuffsij chemicals for plastics, and synthetic textiles in great
quantities. But we know better than to measure the success of export promoting
or import replacing policies on the strength or desparateness of human needs.
96
but rather on the coordinates of international trade and profit.
As Kuznets has remarked, the flow of good,s and services in International
trade "may have a logic of its own," which reflects the conditions internal and
external to each nation and consists of the "material flows of men, goods and
funds; peaceful or warlike; under conditions of political equality or of
dependence; under private auspices or dominated by governmental authority."
The "reojpening of Brazil" in the latter 1960*s, while not overtly accomplished
by foreign gunboats, has been brought about by- a new miliatry regime with a
fresh regard of both the foreigner and its own national needs. The greening of
Brazilian capitalism carries with it its own risks and cycles, to be handled
more openly within the Western industrial community. Even if Brazil should
again face severe import constraints or a crisis of confidence of capital,
there is nothing that would prohibit the economy from picking up where is had
left off in the early 1960*s: new offshore oil discoveries will permit domes
tic replacement of crude and thus the process goes on and on into petrochemicals,
fertilizers, etc. Other intemediate products which are now imported could,
in a pinch, be reworked into the domestic schedules. Charcoal could replace
coal as metallurgical fuel, natural rubber for synthetics, plastics and tires,
and real cotton for synthetic fibers. To regard the maturing of the Brazilian
industrial plant as excessively rigid would not be consistent with the great
but disappointing flexibility of the last 25 years of Imports and growth.
In this sense, the situation today continues much as before, and our
examination of the import elasticities stresses the viability and continuity
underlining the industrial structure. The recent cheapening of foreign ex
change, the liberalization of tariffs, and the easy access to certain kinds of
^^SimonKuznets [60], pp. 2-3
97
foreign technolgies and plans, are all a part of the current process. If out
of this phase should emerge another period of import deprivation, then the ,
process could begin again. This flow of imports, then, continues to be both
a reflection of the growth of Brazilian industry and a critical contributor to
that growth.
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Table A.8
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF COAL
(1,000 Tons)
Year
Apparent
Consumption Production Imports
Import
Coefficient
1959 2,050 1,284 766 37.4
1960 2,205 1,277 928 42.1
1961 2,175 1,256 919 42.3
1962 2,671 1,583 1,089 40.8
1963 2,549 1,542 1,007 39.5
1964 2,698 1,682 1,016 37.7
1965 2,886 1,761 1,125 38.6
1966 3,211 1,735 1,476 33.9
1967 3,469 1,956 1,512 35.3
1968 3,970 2,336 1,634 41.2
1969 3,992 2,343 1,649 39.5
1970 4,040 2,311 1,728 38.7
1971 4,093 2,327 1,766 38.7
1972 4,156 2,461 1,695 40.1
Sources for 1959-68: IBGE,
1969-72: IBGE,
Retrospectivas, p. 199.
Anuario Estadistico 1971, p. 494; 1973,
p. 545.
Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
106
Table A.9
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF COKE
Apparent
Consumption Production
1,819
1,980
2,024
2,010
1,729
1,875
1,905
1,826
Import
Coefficient
Imports (percentage)
89
105
119
184
4.9
5.3
5.9
9.2
Sources: IBGE, Anuarlos 1972, p. 500; 1973, p. 550.
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Table A. 10
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF CRUDE PETROLEUM
(1,000 m^)
Year
Apparent
Consumption Production Imports Exports
Import
Coefficient
1950 55 44 11 20.0
1951 109 90 19 17.9
1952 116 98 17 15.4
1953 150 119 30 20.3
1954 272 129 142 52.4
1955 3,777 264 3,513 93.0
1956 5,418 529 4,889 90.2
1957 6,164 1,318 4,846 78.6
1958 5,832 2,467 5,652 2,288 96.9
1959 8,645 3,751 5,742 1,467^ 66.4
1960 10,412 4,708 5,684 587^ 54.6
1961 12,717 5,5.34 7,549 59.4
1962 16,517 5,313 9,961 60.3
1963 17,697 5,680 10,374 58.6
1964 18,061 5,296 10,803 59.8
1965 17,706 5,460 10,247 57.9
1966 19,756 6,749 11,322 57.3
1967 20,543 8,509 10,559 51.4
1968 23,783 9,510 12,525 . 52.7
1969 27,411 10,072 17,339 63.3
1970 29,592 9,531 20,061 67.8
1971 30,824 8,922 21,902 867 71.1
1972 36,323 8,723 27,600 1,060 76.0
Note: a. from ECLA, Bulletin> Table 29, p. 46, in tons.
Sources: 1950-58: ECLA, loc. cit.
1959-68: IBGE, Retrospectivas; consinnption, p. 141; production,
p. 132; imports, p. 164.
1969-72: IBGE, Anuario 1971, p. 231; 1973, p. 249.
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Table A. 12
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF SEMI-FINISHED STEEL*
(1000 T)
Import
Year Total Production Imports Exports Coefficient
1968 302 414 2 117*/ 0.6
1969 189 215 82 108 43,3
1970 148 196 41 89 27.7
1971 195 195
1972 459 177 282 ~ 61.4
*Includes placas, blocos, tarugos, produced for sale.
Source: Same as table 45.
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Table A.16
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF NICKEL
1968-71
Apparent ^ ^ Import
Year Consumption Production Imports Exports Coefficient
1968 2,077 738 1,736 397 83.6
1969 2,535 1,334 1,873 672 73.9
1970 3,038 2,714 2,258 1,934 63.7
1971^ 3,073 2,593 2,530 2,050 66,7
Notes: a. Preliminary.
b. Nickel content in ferrous-nickel production.
Source: IBGE, Anuario Estadistico 1973.
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Table A.17
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF ALL PAPER
1950-71
(1000 Tons)
Year
Apparent
Consumption Production Imports Exports
Import
Coefficient
1950 316.8 247.9 68.9 21,8
1951 352.3 261.0 91,3 26.0
1952 378.3 261.9 116.5 30,8
1953 403.6 291.4 112.2 27.8
1954 458,0 314.3 143.7 31.4
1955 479.7 333.1 146.5 30.5
1956 545.8 380.5 165,3 30,3
1957 573.0 362.6 210.3 36.7
1958 591.2 416.5 174.7 29,6
1959 609.6 439.9 169,7 27.8
1960 664.8 474.4 190.4 28.6
1961 669.4 501.6 167.8 25.1
1962 699.8 559.6 140.2 20.0
1963 726.7 594.7 132,0 18.2
1964 729.9 650.3 79.6 10.9
1965 691.0 626.9 64,1 9.3
1966 789.8 720.5 69.3 8.8
1967 968.7 862.7 106.3 .3 11.0
1968 1,081.1 912.4 168.9 .2 15.6
1969 1,119.3 969.8 150.1 .6 13.4
1970 1,320.3 1,135.8 186.3 1.8 14.1
1971 1,511,5 1,300.5 214.1 3.1 14.2
Source: 1950-1960; ECLA, Bulletin, table 32, p. 48,
1961-1966; IBGE, Retrospectivas, pp. 136, 200; imports taken as a residual,
1967-1971; IBGE, Anuario Estadistico 1973. p. 548.
Year
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972^
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Table A. 18
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF CHEMICAL PULP
FOR THE PAPER AND PAPERBOARD INDUSTRY
1956-60 and 1967-72
(1000 Tons)
Apparent
Consximption Production
(1)
190
204
215
250
291
512
538
588
684
790
959
(2)
74
100
120
162
210
496
511
584
684
743
926
Imports
(3)
116
104
95
88
81
24
35
21
28
68
167
Exports
(4)
8
7
18
27
22
134
Import
Coefficient
(5)
61.0
51.0
44.0
35.0
28.0
4.8
6.5
3.7
4.1
8.7
17.5
Sources: 1956-60; ECLA, Bulletin, p. 49.
1967-68; IBGE, Anuario 1971, p. 498, called "chemcial cellulose."
1969-72; IBGE, Anuario 1973, p, 549, called "pastas quimicas e
semiquimicas."
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Table A.19
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF RUBBER
(Tons)
Year
Apparent
Consumption Imports
Import
Coefficient
1956 14,627 7,361 50.3
1957 23,939 15,158 63.3
1958 29,037 19,435 66.9
1959 63,017 34,943 55.5
1960 71,439 43,325 60.6
1961 70,330 42,529 60.5
1968 126,829 27,073 21.3
1969 124,318 20,991 16.9
1970 142,695 23,071 16.2
1971 162,003 32,495 20.1
1972 182,668 37,305 20.4
Sources: 1956-58; ECLA, Bulletin, table 33, p. 48,
1959-61; IBGE, Retrospectivas, p. 203.
1968-72; IBGE, Anuario 1973. p. 549,
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Table A. 20
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF CAUSTIC SODA
1956-72
(1000 T)
Year
Apparent
Consumption Imports
Import
Coeffici
1956 175 128 73.1
1957 148 91 ' 61.5
1958 148 88 59.5
1959 166 102 61.4
1960 170 101 59.4
1961 180 109 60.6
1962 232 147 63.4
1963 245 159 64.9
1964 207 117 56.5
1965 166 96 57.8
1966 219 149 68.0
1967 225 128 56.9
1968 329 193 58.7
1969 230 105 45.7
1970 311 164 52.7
1971 303 148 48.8
1972 356 173 48.6
Sources: 1956-59; ECLA, Bulletin, table 28, p. 46.
1960-69; IBGE, Retrospectivas, p. 204 for con
sumption, p. 164 for imports.
1970-72; IBGE, Anuario 1973. p. 554.
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Table A.22
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS OF
(1000 Tons)
WHEAT
}
Year
Apparent
Consumption Production Imports
Import
Coefficient
1959 2,431 611 1,820 74,9
1960 2,746 713 2,033 74.0
1961 2,426 545 1,881 77.5
1962 2,898 706 2,192 75.6
1963 2,568 392 2,176 84.7
1964 3,252 643 2,609 80,2
1965 2,461 585 1,876 76.2
1966 3,009 615 2,394 79.6
1967 3,075 629 2,446 79.5
1968 3,490 856 2,621 75.1
1969 3,742 1,374 2,356 63.0
1970 3,855 1,844 1,969 51.1
1971 n.a. n.a. 1,711
1972 n.a. n.a. 1,797
Sources 1959-67; IBGE, Retrospectivas, pp. 97, 164, production taken
as the difference of cols. 1 and 3.
1968-70; IBGE, Anuario Estadistico 1971. p. 502.
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